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ABSTRACT: As a grand narrative of progress, the utopian project of modernity is primarily 
concerned with notions of rationalism, universalism, and the development of a metalanguage. 
The triumph of the Moderate Enlightenment has seen logics of domination, accumulation and 
individualism incorporated into the project of modernity, with these logics giving rise to 
globalised capitalism as the metalanguage of modernity and neoliberal economics as the grand 
narrative of rational progress. The project of modernity is all but complete, requiring only the 
formality of an end. However, rather than utopia, the foreseeable endpoint of modernity is 
environmental collapse, with neoliberal economics also serving as a grand narrative of 
environmental destruction. As an anti-modern response, postmodernism has been a 
triumphant failure. While there is much to be gained from the postmodern critique of 
modernity, its incredulity towards metanarratives has left it incapable of forming an adequate 
response to modernity, especially in regards to action on climate change. Postmodernism is 
better characterized as a crisis located within modernity itself and it will be argued that rather 
than the pursuit of the modern or the post-modern, we need to re-imagine ourselves as proto-
historical to overcome the impasse of late-capitalism. 
KEYWORDS: Proto-historicism; Postmodernism; Modernism; Modernity; Narrative; 
Neoliberalism 
 
I: BLINDED BY THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE MAKING OF A MECHANISTIC 
MODERNITY 
Science will teach men … that they … are no more than a sort of piano keyboard 
or barrel-organ cylinder … that whatever man does he does not do of his own 
volition but … by the laws of nature. Consequently, these laws of nature have only 
www.cosmosandhistory.org  22 
 ANDREW KIRKPATRICK 23 
to be discovered, and man will no longer be responsible for his actions, and it will 
become extremely easy for him to live his life.1 
 
Those of us living in the present can agree that we inhabit the modern era, but are we 
all modern? What separates the modern from the primitive? Can this distinction even 
be made between temporal contemporaries? Habermas points out that the term 
‘modern’ has a long history, with its Latin form modernus being used as early as the fifth 
century in order to distinguish the Christian present in opposition to the Roman and 
Pagan past.2 He identifies it as an expression of ‘the consciousness of an epoch that 
relates itself to the past of antiquity, in order to view itself as the result of a transition 
from the old to the new.’3 The difficulty we find in categorizing the modern as an era 
is due to the synonymous relationship it has with the contemporary. If we are talking 
about ‘the modern’, we are often talking about ‘the now’, the ‘cutting edge’ or the 
most advanced up until a point in time. As Habermas maintains, modernity can be 
viewed in contrast to the ancient, but even this can be problematic.  
For instance, the French revolutionaries of the late eighteenth century were eager 
to dispose of what they called the ancien régime, despite the fact that this regime only 
extended back to the fifteenth century where the seeds of Renaissance modernity were 
being sown.4 In contrast to the modernity of the fifth century Christians, this regime 
was a thousand years more modernus, yet only three hundred years ancien when 
compared to the revolutionaries who sought to overthrow it. In this sense, Harvey 
aptly describes the modern era as ‘ephemeral and fleeting,’5 constantly changing and 
rearranging the scope of itself. The modern, it would seem, is never fixed. Rather, it is 
constantly shedding its prior self, only to rematerialize ad infinitum. The modern is the 
new, it is the progressive, and it is the result of history’s long march forward.  
Modernity: an Enlightenment Ideology 
Despite the difficulty in defining the ‘modern era’ as a fixed period, as an epoch and 
an ideal, the notions of modernity we experience in the twenty-first century arose with 
the philosophies of the European Enlightenment. Giddens describes modernity as the 
‘modes of social life and organization which emerged from Europe about the 
1 F. Dostoyevsky, Notes from Underground, trans. J. Coulson, Melbourne, Penguin Books, 2010, p. 27. 
2 J. Habermas, ‘Modernity – An Incomplete Project’, in H. Foster (ed.), The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on 
Postmodern Culture, Port Townsend, Bay Press, 1983, p. 3. 
3 Ibid. 
4 S. Toulmin, Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1990, 
pp. 22-23. 
5 D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1990, p. 11. 
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seventeenth century onwards and … subsequently became more or less worldwide in 
their influence.’6 Similarly, Toulmin argues that notions of modernism and modernity 
are ‘held together by … a shared conception of rationality, which came to the fore in 
the seventeenth century, and has come to dominate Western thinking ever since.’7 For 
Habermas, ‘the project of modernity’ came into focus during the eighteenth century 
through the efforts of philosophers to develop ‘objective science, universal morality, 
and law … according to their inner logic.’8 This project aimed to deliver ‘the 
development of rational forms of social organization and rational modes of thought,’ 
as Enlightenment thinkers actively sought ‘to break with history and tradition.’9 The 
Enlightenment can thus be viewed as a defining epoch in which the otherwise passive 
notion of temporal modernity collided with an emerging ideological goal to actively 
become modern. This saw the Enlightenment embrace progress while crystallizing the 
goals of modernity into a unifying grand narrative that would see Western civilization 
emerge as the harbingers of a universal and rational process of modernization.  
The Telos of Modernity: Metalanguage and Utopia 
The goals of the Enlightenment and the beliefs it took to be axiomatic were that ‘there 
could only be one possible answer to any question … [and] the world could be 
controlled and rationally ordered if we could only picture and represent it rightly.’10 A 
quest for efficiency, the project of modernity makes the assumption that ‘the surface 
complexity of nature and humanity distracts us from an underlying Order, which is 
intrinsically simple and permanent.’11 Harvey identifies universal modernism as ‘the 
belief in linear progress, absolute truths, and the rational planning of ideal social 
orders,’ which would culminate in the ‘standardization of knowledge and 
production.’12 As such, it seeks to order society rationally and efficiently by developing 
or uncovering a metalanguage that can be used to describe reality objectively. The telos 
of modernity can therefore be seen as reaching a utopia of absolute knowledge, in 
which the true, objective nature of reality can be understood in its entirety through the 
development of a universal metalanguage.  
Modernity, then, is inherently reductionist, with the goal of systematically reducing 
concepts of truth to a singularity, within which the true nature of reality can be 
understood purely and objectively. The goals of modernity can thus be understood as 
6 A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1990, p. 1 
7 Toulmin, p. 198. 
8 Habermas, ‘Modernity – An Incomplete Project’, p. 9. 
9 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 12. 
10 Ibid., p. 27. 
11 Toulmin, p. 201. 
12 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 9. 
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threefold: as a commitment to progress, to the rational organization of society, and to 
the development of a metalanguage under which all else can be understood.  
A Tale of Two Enlightenments 
While modernity can be characterized as a unified quest to uncover the universal 
truths that govern the natural world, the realization of modernity can be understood as 
a struggle between two competing traditions of thought; that of the Radical and the 
Moderate Enlightenments. The Radical Enlightenment, defined by Gare as the ‘true’ 
Enlightenment, ‘evolved out of the Renaissance quest for liberty and democracy,’ 
whereas the Moderate or ‘fake’ Enlightenment was intended to ‘neutralize the ideas of 
the Radical Enlightenment.’13  
In the intellectual tradition of the Renaissance, the Radical Enlightenment 
celebrated the world and life as creative.14 It built on the democratic ideals of the Civic 
Humanists, for whom ‘liberty was characterised as being a member of and an active 
participant in a free, self-governing community,’ and the Nature Enthusiasts, who 
were hostile to hierarchical power structures and promoted egalitarianism.15 As a 
continuation of these Renaissance ideals, the Radical Enlightenment rejected all 
compromise with the past and sought to sweep away existing power structures 
entirely.16 The Radical Enlightenment was an anti-aristocratic, republican movement 
that rejected divine-right monarchy in favour of egalitarian and democratic virtues.17 
By contrast, the Moderate Enlightenment ‘aspired to conquer ignorance and 
superstition … by means of philosophy but in such a way as to preserve and safeguard 
… essential elements of older structures, effecting a viable synthesis of old and new, 
and of reason and faith.’18 Inspired mainly by Descartes, Hobbes, Newton, and Locke, 
the Moderate Enlightenment was developing its ideas in direct opposition to the 
democratic and egalitarian impulses of the Radical Enlightenment.19  
As the mainstream branch of the Enlightenment, the Moderate Enlightenment 
found support in governments and influential church factions,20 allowing it to 
13 A. Gare, ‘Reviving the Radical Enlightenment: Process Philosophy and the Struggle for Democracy’, 
www.academia.edu/5692810/Reviving_the_Radical_Enlightenment_Process_Philosophy_and_the_Strug
gle_for_Democracy, 2008, (accessed 3 June 2014) 2008, p. 1. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., p. 6. 
16 J. Israel, Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001, p. 11. 
17 Ibid., p. 21. 
18 Ibid., p. 11. 
19 Gare, ‘Reviving the Radical Enlightenment’, p. 9. 
20 Israel, p. 11. 
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ultimately triumph over its radical counterpart. As a result, the modernity inherited by 
Western civilisation is one that is infused with the philosophies of the Moderate 
Enlightenment, and Gare argues that the triumph of the Moderate Enlightenment has 
resulted ‘in the massive concentration of wealth and power,’ with a world-system that 
is ‘inexorably undermining the environmental conditions for human existence.’21  
Mechanistic Materialism: The Logic of Domination 
A feature of the Moderate Enlightenment is the development and imposition of a 
mechanical view on nature. Initiated by Descartes, this mechanical philosophy 
provided the impetus for Enlightenment thinkers to ‘bring all beliefs before the bar of 
reason and to create a rational society accordingly.’22 Seeking to replace ‘the authority 
of tradition, dogma, faith, superstition and prejudice’ with a new method modeled on 
mathematical thinking, Descartes provided a picture of the natural world as a single 
system that could be accurately described and explained by rational principles.23 
Insisting that animals were ‘nothing more than complicated machines,’ Descartes 
extended this to the human body, which he saw as a no more than a mechanical 
system.24 Conceiving of minds as ‘thinking substances … disjoined from the extended 
matter of the physical universe,’25 Descartes separated the world of rational human 
experience from the world of mechanical natural phenomena.26 This separation ‘left 
open the possibility … that all reality, including humanity and human thought, could 
be explained through a purely materialistic philosophy.’27 By making a distinction 
between the mind and body, Descartes effectively severed the two, creating a 
decontextualised concept of consciousness that was separated from the mechanical 
workings of the body. As Cartesian dualism saw consciousness become disembodied, 
the body could be viewed as nothing but a vehicle to mediate our experience with the 
external world, thereby asserting ‘the right for thinking men … to impose their will … 
to order and control society as well as nature.’28 Rationality took on an immutable, 
platonic form, while the body merely became the means to pursue rationalist ends.  
21 Gare, ‘Reviving the Radical Enlightenment’, p. 15. 
22 A. Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 38. 
23 Ibid., p. 37. 
24 P.J. Bowler, The Earth Encompassed: A History of the Environmental Sciences, New York, W.W Norton & 
Company, 1992, p. 93. 
25 Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, p. 37. 
26 Toulmin, p. 107. 
27 M.C. Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans, London, George Allen & 
Unwin, 1981, p. 44. 
28 Ibid., p. 43. 
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Following on from Descartes, Hobbes saw the world as matter in motion, defined 
by mathematically measurable attributes and moved forces inherent to it.29 He saw 
such mechanical operations as offering a sufficient explanation of natural phenomena, 
and attempted to apply these mathematical principles to the social actions of men.30 
Hobbes ‘analysed men as mechanisms in motion, as essentially self-moved matter,’ 
with their political morality ‘springing from their actions or motions … from their 
desires, passions and repugnances, and not from any outside source … or 
supernaturally endowed ethical standard.’31 From this we can see Hobbes’ bleak, 
materialistic worldview, in which men are merely machines driven by appetites and 
aversions, 32 moved only by the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance of pain, with this 
mechanical philosophy later giving rise to utilitarianism.33 
Further elaboration on the mechanical worldview was provided by Newton, whose 
laws of motion dictate that: 
 
i. Every body preserves its state of rest, or uniform motion in a straight line, 
except in so far as it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it. 
ii. The rate of change of linear momentum is proportional to the force applied, 
and takes place in a straight line in which the force acts. 
iii. To every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.34 
These laws view all matter as inert and acted upon by outside influences, providing the 
image of a static world set in motion by an abstract force. Newton’s cosmology 
provided an empirically testable metaphysical framework, which underpinned a 
mechanical view of the world rooted in mathematics. This upheld the view of the 
universe as posited by Descartes and Hobbes, while providing a model around which 
an orderly society could be based.35 The accuracy and success of the Newtonian 
method in predicting and explaining natural phenomena became a clear indication 
that ‘the application of rational methods would lead to the uncovering of all nature’s 
secrets.’36 This vindicated the mechanical worldview through the demonstration of 
seemingly pre-existent mathematical laws and attributes, while demonstrating the 
predictability—and subsequent passivity—of the natural world.  
29 Ibid., p. 75. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Gare, ‘Reviving the Radical Enlightenment’, p. 8. 
33 Ibid., p.10. 
34 S. Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 261. 
35 Bowler, p. 95. 
36 Ibid., p. 85. 
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The result of these mechanistic philosophies meant that the natural world was 
reduced to no more than a physical resource at the mercy of rational beings to exploit 
and control. With this came the strong belief that further control over the world could 
be actively achieved through the discovery and utilization of the rational laws that 
govern it. 
Epistemological Materialism: The Logic of Accumulation 
Materialism was subsequently extended to the non-physical world, typified by the 
Enlightenment quest to accumulate knowledge in order to control the world. For early 
Enlightenment thinker Francis Bacon, science was ‘the widest possible accumulation of 
knowledge.’37 Similarly, Hobbes argued that science was ‘merely the accumulation of 
knowledge of how to control the world,’38 while the reward promised to those 
following the Cartesian scientific method was ‘nothing less than mastery over nature.’39 
Cassirer notes that for the Enlightenment, reason came to be viewed as an 
‘acquisition’ rather than a heritage,40 and Habermas identifies the goal of 
Enlightenment philosophers as utilizing ‘this accumulation … for the rational 
organization of everyday social life.’41 Harvey maintains that the nature of 
Enlightenment thinkers was ‘to use the accumulation of knowledge generated by many 
individuals … for the pursuit of human emancipation and the enrichment of daily 
life.’42 From this we can identify not only a materialistic approach to knowledge, but 
also a sense of epistemological utility. Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the 
Enlightenment effectively turned thought into an instrument or thing,43 with this 
instrumental reasoning carrying an implication of means and ends, whereby 
knowledge is seen as a tool that can be used to achieve materialist goals. For the 
Enlightenment, knowledge was quite literally there to be discovered, acquired, and used 
for the betterment of mankind. The assumption that knowledge and truth exist 
ontologically as ‘things’ to be discovered or attained through the implementation of a 
rational method is illustrated in the philosophy of Descartes.  
37 M.C. Jacob, The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1988, p. 
31. 
38 Gare, ‘Reviving the Radical Enlightenment’, p. 16. 
39 Jacob, The Cultural Meaning of the Scientific Revolution, p. 59. 
40 E. Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment, trans. F.C.A. Koelln and J.P. Pettegrove, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1951, p.13. 
41 Habermas, ‘Modernity – An Incomplete Project’, p. 9. 
42 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 12. 
43 M. Horkheimer and T.W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. J. Cumming, New York, The 
Continuum Publishing Company, 1944 p. 25. 
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By taking truth to be absolute, Descartes ‘hoped to elevate questions of 
epistemology … out of reach of contextual analysis,’44 effectively assigning all notions 
of knowledge to an immutable, platonic realm removed from the subjectivity of 
everyday experience. Descartes maintained that rational thought ‘could not rely on 
inherited tradition,’45 and, wherever possible, the rational thing to do was to clean the 
intellectual slate and ‘start from scratch.’46 By taking into account the reductionist 
belief that reality is no more than the sum of its parts, Cartesian philosophy dictates 
that we can—and should—examine things in isolation through the implementation of 
a disembodied and objective approach to rationality. However, Toulmin identifies that 
‘when dealing with intellectual or practical problems, we can never totally clean the 
slate and start from scratch, as Descartes demands.’47 The act of doing so would forfeit 
our own consciousness and contexts—the very conditions by which we are able to 
think at all. By starting from scratch, Descartes assumes that all rational beings would 
come to the same conclusion, as there can exist only one ‘true’ answer to any possible 
question. This is the ontological nature of objective and universal reason, and Toulmin 
argues that this ‘decontextualised ideal’ has remained a ‘central demand of rational 
thought … among modern thinkers well into the twentieth century.’48  
As an extension of the mechanical worldview, epistemological materialism lends 
itself to a logic of accumulation, whereby the active accumulation of knowledge is seen 
to lead—in a linear, Newtonian fashion—to the further control and mastery over 
nature. This logic of accumulation is more inherent in modernity than the mere 
acquisition of knowledge. Modernity itself, as the product of a chronological march 
forward, is primarily conceived as the accumulation of time. Time has, in this sense, 
become a demonstrative tool of progress, tightly wound up in the definition of 
modernity. The very nature of modernity is an accumulative process. Following on 
from the materialist tradition, this has been extended to material possessions. The 
importance of accumulation is further demonstrated in the third logic of modernity, in 
which individual property rights and the accumulation of wealth become key attributes 
of a modern society. 
44 Toulmin, p. 44. 
45 Ibid., p. 199. 
46 Ibid.  
47 Ibid., p. 82. 
48 Ibid., p. 200. 
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Leviathan and Liberalism: The Logic of Individualism 
A third logic evident in the philosophies of the Moderate Enlightenment is the appeal 
to individualism. Horkheimer and Adorno argue that the Enlightenment ‘has always 
aimed at liberating men from fear and establishing their sovereignty,’49 with the 
project of modernity promising ‘liberation from the irregularities of myth, religion, 
superstition, [and] release from the arbitrary use of power.’50 According to Habermas, 
‘Above all, the modern age stood under the sign of subjective freedom,’ with society 
the space in which one’s own interests could be rationally pursued.51 
One of the key Enlightenment demands for individual freedom is from the tyranny 
of tradition—of monarchs, religion and superstition. This logic of liberation and 
individualism is manifest in two seemingly contradictory ways; the first in Hobbes’ 
conception of society as demonstrated in Leviathan, the latter displayed in the classic 
liberalism derived from John Locke and Adam Smith. While Locke shares much of his 
philosophy with Hobbes, a transition from the Hobbesian philosophy towards classic 
liberalism can be traced through Locke to Smith who, while not necessarily a 
Moderate Enlightenment thinker, made important contributions to the individualism 
inherent in modernity today. However, as with many Enlightenment philosophies, the 
origin of the emphasis on the individual can be found in Descartes.  
Descartes’ proposition, ‘I think, therefore I am,’ rested upon the preeminence of 
the thinking ‘I’, and the assumption that individuals can achieve complete mastery 
over their own intellectual processes and the world around them.52 This ‘aggressive 
assertion of the self’ was encouraged in intellectual matters, in the organization of 
society, and also in the pursuit of material interests.53 By giving a first person account 
to the theory of knowledge, Descartes effectively located the principle reality in the 
self,54 with the individual justifying not only claims to existence, but to rational thought 
and agency in an otherwise passive world.  
The primacy of the individual and the implicit assertion of the self can also be 
found in Hobbes’s political philosophy. In a world of many individuals, Hobbes saw 
the natural state of man as ‘a condition of [war] of every one against every one’ in 
which man is governed by his own reason.55 He characterizes the life of man as 
‘solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short,’ marked by ‘continuall feare, and danger of 
49 Horkheimer and Adorno, p. 3. 
50 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 12. 
51 J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1987, p. 
83. 
52 Jacob, The Radical Enlightenment, p. 43. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Blackburn, p. 101. 
55 T. Hobbes, Leviathan, London, Penguin Books, 1985 p. 189. 
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violent death.’56 According to Hobbes, natural law dictates that man is ‘forbidden to 
do, that, which is destructive of his [own] life.’57 For Hobbes, reason dictates that ‘in 
such a condition, every man has a Right to every thing; even to one anothers body … 
therefore, as long as this naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there 
can be no security to any man.’58 Hobbes makes the assumption of a natural state of 
war between men, whose insatiable appetites will ultimately lead to their conflict and 
demise unless moderated or controlled by a central power, which he embodies in an 
autocratic monarch. He proposes a social contract in which freedom is a trade of one’s 
liberty in return for personal safety, with men able to contract to one another in order to 
collectively lift themselves out of barbarism.59 It then becomes in the best interest of 
the individual to obey the laws of a sovereign for their own sake, rather than for the 
sake of others. 
Contrary to the Hobbesian concept of individuality, classic liberalism emerged as a 
political ideology centered upon the individual as having natural rights against the 
government.60 Classic liberalism sees men as ‘naturally endowed with the right to life, 
liberty, and property’ with the role of government being limited to ‘securing and 
protecting these individual rights, especially private property.’61 Developed in 
opposition to the ‘mercantilism of monarchs, who exercised almost total control over 
the economy,’62 classic liberals preached the virtues of the ‘free market’ and ‘laissez-
faire’ economics.63 In this way, classic liberalism ‘naturalized the market as a system 
with its own rationality, its own interest and its own specific efficiency … as a 
distributor of goods and services.’64 However, like Hobbes, classic liberalism sees 
relations in the marketplace as mediated by an exchange of certain freedoms for a set of 
rights and liberties.65 Two important thinkers in the classic liberal tradition are John 
Locke and Adam Smith.  
Following on from Hobbes, Locke argued that in a state of nature, all men were 
free and equal, possessing inalienable rights independent of any government or 
56 Ibid., p. 186. 
57 Ibid., p. 189. 
58 Ibid., p. 190. 
59 Blackburn, p. 176. 
60 Ibid., p. 218. 
61 M.B. Steger and R.K. Roy, Neoliberalism: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
p. 5. 
62 Ibid., p. 2. 
63 Ibid. 
64 J. Read, ‘A Genealogy of Homo-Economicus: Neoliberalism and the Production of Subjectivity’, 
Foucault Studies, No 6, pp. 25-36, Feb 2009, p. 27. 
65 Ibid. 
                                                          
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 32 
authority.66 He saw the natural state of men as a ‘state of perfect freedom’ in which 
one could ‘order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they see 
fit … without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man.’67 However, 
Locke maintains that ‘though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of license, 
[and] though man in that state have uncontrollable liberty … he has not liberty to 
destroy himself.’68 As with Hobbes, this is an appeal to self-preservation, and like 
Hobbes, Locke offers reason as the method to achieve this, arguing that ‘the state of 
nature has a law to govern it … [and] reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind 
who will but consult it that … no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, 
or possessions.’69 In order to guarantee one’s own safety, Locke sees the need for man 
to quit this state of nature, and to elevate himself into civil society to avoid a natural 
state of war. Like Hobbes, he appeals to a central power, ‘for where there is an 
authority, a power on earth from which relief can be had by appeal … the state of war 
is excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power.’70 However, unlike the 
tyranny of a monarch that Hobbes advocates, Locke places his faith in a lawful society 
based around private property rights in which political authority is derived from 
individuals.71  
Smith further developed Locke’s emphasis on private property with a political 
philosophy centered on economic freedoms. Based on the tendency of mankind to 
‘truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another,’ Smith sees the potential of man as 
uniquely collaborative when contrasted with other animals.72 For Smith, this capacity 
for fair and deliberate exchange leads to a degree of co-dependence between men, 
resulting in mutual benefit in terms of economic growth, prosperity and social 
development.73 In this sense, the pursuit of self-interest is seen to actively promote the 
common good.74 Placing a large emphasis on the ‘natural state’ of the free market as 
the condition for ‘perfect liberty’, Smith saw the intervention of governments, the 
development of monopolies, the formation of trade unions and the fixing of prices as 
66 Steger and Roy, p. 5. 
67 J. Locke, ‘Two Treatises of Government (1690)’ in P. Hyland, O. Gomez and F. Greensides (ed.), The 
Enlightenment: A Sourcebook and Reader, London, Routledge, 2003, p.154. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 155. 
71 P. Hyland, O. Gomez and F. Greensides (ed.), The Enlightenment: A Sourcebook and Reader, London, 
Routledge, 2003, p. 154. 
72 A. Smith, ‘The Wealth of Nations (1776)’ in P. Hyland, O. Gomez and F. Greensides (ed.), The 
Enlightenment: A Sourcebook and Reader, London, Routledge, 2003, p. 198. 
73 Hyland et al., p. 193. 
74 Blackburn, p. 354. 
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undermining public welfare and prosperity.75 Rather, through free trade and the 
pursuit of private gain, individuals could, through their own capacity for reason, ‘strike 
deals and contracts to their own advantage.’76 The implication of this being that the 
more ‘reasonable’ a man is, the greater his prosperity will be. In this sense, it is in 
everyone’s best interests to act reasonably in accordance with the free market.  
Smith is also credited with developing the concept of homo-economicus as an 
economic anthropology of man. Homo-economicus takes for granted that the natural state 
of man is that of exchange, whereby ‘everything for which human beings attempt to 
realize their ends … can be understood economically.’77 This approach views people 
as ‘isolated individuals whose actions reflect mostly their material self-interest.’78 
Similar to the Hobbesian appeal to men being moved by appetites and aversions, 
homo-economicus is propelled by economic self-interest.  
Both the logics of Leviathan and liberalism place the individual at the fore of 
modern society. As individuals endowed with innate rationality, to act in accordance 
with reason is to act in the material best interest of the self. 
The Logics of Modernity 
The mechanistic materialist tradition inaugurated a process of modernization that saw 
the fundamental nature of reality organized around a substance-based philosophy. 
The world could be explained in mechanical terms, knowledge seen as a thing to be 
hoarded, and humans understood as economic agents acting on behalf of their 
material wants and needs. By viewing all physical reality as primarily consisting of 
inert matter in motion, the mechanistic materialists reduced the whole world to a 
‘gigantic piece of clockwork with which humankind could tinker at will.’79 Human 
beings could now be seen as no more than cogs inhabiting a vast machine, with 
mechanistic materialism becoming an expression of our growing detachment and 
alienation from the world.80 By ascribing the implicit role of service and utility to both 
humanity and nature, the mechanistic materialists demystified these concepts. Nature 
had been denatured, and man had been made alien to it—quite literally extra-
terrestrial and outside the world. The mechanical metaphor symbolized the means by 
75 Hyland et al., p. 193. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Read, p. 28. 
78 Steger and Roy, pp. 2-3. 
79 Bowler, p. 91. 
80 A. Gare, Nihilism Inc.: Environmental Destruction and the Metaphysics of Sustainability, Como, Eco-Logical 
Press, 1996, p. 123. 
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which nature could be controlled and subordinated,81 with human progress gauged by 
the development of further mastery over nature.82  
As products of Enlightenment epistemology took on static and immutable forms, 
they came to exist as unchanging principles that guided the inert and irrational world 
of matter. While the idea of a perfect reality removed from our own can be traced 
back to Plato and beyond, it took on renewed significance during the Enlightenment, 
having instilled modernity with an ideological drive to actively accumulate rational 
forms and apply them to the mechanical world. With the promise of knowledge 
equating to control over nature, knowledge became power, and the accumulation of it 
paramount for the purposes of modernity. As ‘the scientific domination of nature 
promised freedom from scarcity [and] want,’83 scientific knowledge then became the 
central tool for the mechanistic materialist. The accumulation of knowledge would 
facilitate not only the further control over nature and the acquisition of abundance, 
but would serve as the tangible indicator of rational progress.  
The logics of domination and accumulation are enhanced by the individualist 
philosophies of the Moderate Enlightenment. The logic of individualism sees the act of 
competition as a positive affirmation of rights, liberty and the sovereignty of the self. It 
encourages self-interest above that of others and sees individual gain as the sole 
motivating force behind mankind. Relying on the assumption of homo-economicus as an 
accurate portrayal of man, classic liberals envisage a world in which—rather than a 
state of literal and physical war—men are free to rationally and ruthlessly compete in 
the marketplace under the governance of natural market laws. This works off the 
assumption that, rationally, every man is actively working to increase his own 
economic advantage. 
Deus Ex Machina: Grand Architects, Autocrats, and Hidden Hands 
While these three logics of modernity share repeated references to reason and 
rationality, what is more striking is the inclusion of a deus ex machina to either control 
the mechanical world or set it in motion. A deus ex machina, or ‘god from the machine,’ 
is defined as ‘a theatrical device whereby a supernatural agency is introduced to solve 
[a] dramatic situation … [as] any artificial, introduced, external, [or] ad hoc solution 
to the problem.’84  
81 Ibid., p. 134. 
82 Ibid., p. 27. 
83 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 12. 
84 Blackburn, p. 103. 
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Although Descartes argued the human body was nothing more than a mechanical 
system, he maintained there must still be a soul integrated somehow.85 Despite the 
materialist reductionism inherent in his work, Descartes still made room for his 
Christian beliefs. Similarly, Newton, who inaugurated the ‘new science’ of the 
Enlightenment, saw the role of God as paramount in constructing the universe, even 
‘[regarding] himself more as a theologian than … a scientist.’86 His cosmology dictated 
that the physical universe could be understood by mathematics and experiment, but 
only through reference to mechanical laws emanating from a supernatural being.87 For 
Newton, ‘matter, motion, and the mathematical laws of nature … [originated] in the 
will and power of the Almighty,’88 with Newton insisting on the existence of ‘a 
supernatural being separate from nature … [who] imposes order in nature and 
society.’ Referred to as the ‘Grand Architect,’ this was ‘a supernatural entity that could 
be worshipped by either Christians or deists,’ the function of which resembled ‘that of 
the strong, but not arbitrary, monarch.’89  
While Hobbes’ conception of the world was ultimately atheistic, he was concerned 
with maintaining absolute rule through an earthly monarch. His concept of Leviathan, 
characterized as an ‘irresistible monster,’90 is a fear-inspiring image akin to an all-
powerful deity, albeit embodied in an autocratic ruler. However, the implication of 
Leviathan extends beyond the individual ruler. The Leviathan is depicted as an 
anthropomorphic being, with the State literally conceived as an artificial man, a Body 
Politique, ‘of greater stature and strength than the Naturall,’91 which would serve to 
dominate the natural world and men alike. Effectively, Hobbes sought to replace God 
with a modern, mechanical, and monolithic State. 
The supernatural explanation for a pre-ordered rationality offered by classic 
liberalism is the conception of the ‘hidden hand.’ Classic liberals believed that society 
could be moderated by an ‘invisible hand,’92 and placed their faith in the infallible, 
arbitrating nature of the free market. The significance of a ‘hidden hand’ again 
conjures God-like imagery, and implies autonomy on the part of the free market. The 
market is attributed sentience as a functional force whose fluctuations we should act in 
85 Bowler, p. 93. 
86 L. White Jr., ‘The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis’, in I.G. Barbour (ed.), Western Man and 
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accordance with. This conception of the market sees it as natural rather than artificial, 
and as primary rather than emergent. 
Inherent in the philosophies of the Moderate Enlightenment is the need for man to 
be subordinate to a higher power. By proposing otherworldly perfection that man has 
the capacity to synchronize with rationally, these philosophies encouraged deference 
towards abstract laws and powers whose inherent reasonableness would elevate men 
from otherwise animalistic tendencies. While the Enlightenment is often contrasted 
with tradition, the philosophies of the Moderate Enlightenment tended to incorporate 
pre-existing traditions, and in instances where this was not the case, merely inaugurated 
new traditions to similar effect. For Descartes and Newton, the ultimate authority 
remained God. For Hobbes it was more literal, insisting on a monarch. For classic 
liberals, the abstract hidden hand of the free market became the de facto source of 
rational guidance. These appeals to a rational authority demonstrate how the 
philosophies of the Moderate Enlightenment ultimately sought to reinforce or simply 
remake traditional powers. The Moderate Enlightenment can therefore be seen as an 
intellectual sleight of hand; espousing notions of modernity, rationality and liberty 
while simultaneously re-enforcing the overall centralization of power in the hands of a 
privileged elite. In response to the genuinely progressive nature of the Renaissance and 
the Radical Enlightenment, the moderate thinkers offered piecemeal philosophies that, 
while suitably novel and revolutionary for their time, were restricted by pre-existing 
power structures. They promoted ‘modern’ insights that would go some way to 
satisfying Enlightenment curiosity, but simultaneously reinforced the established 
traditions of the Church and the Monarchy, while for classic liberals, the sanctity of 
the free market and private property became paramount.  
This shift in tradition is demonstrated in the French revolution of 1789, where the 
overthrow of the ancien régime coincided with the inauguration of a new capitalist 
tradition.  
Bourgeois Revolt: Liberty, Equality, and Property 
The French revolution of 1789 is seen by many to be the turning point of modernity, 
particularly in reference to the development of modern liberal democracies and the 
emergence of capitalist societies. As a political manifestation of Enlightenment 
philosophies, the revolution ‘overtly challenged the three principle pillars of medieval 
and early modern society—monarchy, aristocracy, and the Church—going some way 
to overturning all three.’93 Israel describes it as ‘one of the great defining episodes in 
93 Israel, p. 714. 
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the history of modernity,’94 while for Habermas the French revolution signified the 
very beginning of the modern era.95  
Essentially a struggle of non-nobles against aristocrats,96 the French revolution saw 
the development of a class-conscious bourgeoisie. In what became a ‘conflict between 
progressive capitalist-oriented classes and the retrograde aristocratic classes,’97 the 
revolution saw men of non-noble backgrounds, but of economic means, assert 
themselves in public and social life. As the burgeoning capitalist classes became aware 
of the disparity between their wealth and social usefulness, on the one hand, and their 
lack of opportunity and social prestige on the other,98 the bourgeoisie of the French 
revolution became the perfect embodiment of the Enlightenment man. They came to 
see themselves as ‘individuals … separated from those above by rejecting privilege, from 
those below by personal merit, and by emancipation from ignorance and 
backwardness … by use of reason.’99 This assertion of the self saw the coming-of-age of 
homo-economicus, with the revolution not only won by the bourgeoisie,100 but also 
formative of the bourgeoisie101 as a distinct class with interests of its own.  
While it is true that ‘by destroying the ancien régime, the French Revolution opened 
the road to democracy and political participation,’102 to who was this participation 
open? Even though the French revolution of 1789 involved the participation of the 
working classes, it was the bourgeoisie who initially benefited.  Hobsbawm argues that 
the ‘equality’ achieved by the revolution was not intended to be egalitarian or 
democratic, and that it was not pressing the social and political claims of all 
commoners. Rather, it was those in the ‘available’ classes of ‘professional men’ in the 
Third Estate who were to benefit.103 Elections became ‘restricted to the enlightened,’ 
constituting an ‘open elite selected for talent, irrespective of birth,’ demonstrated 
chiefly through ‘property and education.’104 Elite status came to be recognized as the 
control of landed property, with the development of the 1791 constitution making 
94 Ibid. 
95 Toulmin, p. 8. 
96 E. Hobsbawm, ‘The Making of a “Bourgeois Revolution”’, in F. Fehér (ed.), The French Revolution and the 
Birth of Modernity, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1990, p. 40. 
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‘every public position … largely confined to men of … property.’105 In this sense, 
property became the new privilege, as the hereditary titles of land effectively replaced 
the hereditary titles of nobility. The nouveau élite in French society came to be defined in 
terms of ‘landholding … with the hereditary element confined to the simple passage of 
wealth and its advantages from one generation to another.’106  
The outcome of the French revolution was the development of a self-conscious 
class of free flowing capitalists and professional men who—guided by rationality—
were able to assert their economic dominance over the traditions and pretentions of 
the ancien régime. As the acquisition of nobility became increasingly irrelevant, elite 
status was developed around attributes of wealth, no matter how acquired or 
expressed.107 Capital therefore became the new tradition, with the French revolution 
establishing ‘a framework for the emergence of the capitalist economy … a class 
society and … the modern world.’108  
Hobsbawm argues that ‘the ideology of the Enlightenment inevitably made 
economic progress into a central aim of society,’ with ‘post-revolutionary France … a 
society in which, more than any other, wealth was power and men were dedicated to 
the accumulation of it.’109 The French revolution thus echoed the Moderate 
Enlightenment logics of individualism and accumulation, where the rational 
imposition of these modern attributes became the logical justification for the political 
dominance of a particular class of modern men.  
II: THE COMPLETED PROJECT OF MODERNITY: CAPITALISM, NEOLIBERALISM 
AND ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION 
As far as I know you deduce the whole range of human satisfactions as averages 
from statistical figures and scientifico-economic formulas. You recognise things 
like wealth, freedom, comfort, prosperity, and so on as good, so that a man who 
deliberately and openly went against that tabulation would in your opinion, and 
of course in mine also, be an obscurantist or else completely mad, wouldn’t he?110 
 
While the philosophies of the Moderate Enlightenment may no longer be the explicit 
point of reference for twenty-first century modernity, culturally, their legacy has 
endured. From the Moderate Enlightenment, we can understand the modernization 
105 Lucas, p. 126. 
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110 Dostoyevsky, p. 23. 
                                                          
 ANDREW KIRKPATRICK 39 
process as thus: dismantle tradition (to a tolerable extent), reduce reality to a single 
language (a medium of equivalence), accumulate knowledge (or ‘power’) within said 
language, and apply this knowledge in order to control the natural world. This is a 
process that has been uniform with the rise of globalised capitalism and the 
development of neoliberal economics as the grand narrative of modernity.  
The Metalanguage: Capitalism 
Capital has become the universal metalangauge of modernity. It is the single value by 
which all aspects of life can be measured. Global in its application, the origins of 
capitalism are inherently international in scope.111 As a ‘medium of exchange,’ capital 
‘negates the content of goods or services by substituting them [with] an impersonal 
standard.’112 It permits the exchange of ‘anything for anything,’113 making globalised 
capitalism the metalanguage par excellence for the project of modernity. Coinciding with 
the development of globalised capitalism, we have also seen the rise of a new class of 
international bourgeoisie. Gare identifies the international bourgeoisie as agents of 
transnational capitalism who have brought to fulfillment a modern and refined version 
of the mechanical world-view.114 It is no accident that the rise of the international 
bourgeoisie has coincided with the development of a globalised metalanguage, as the 
very goal of modernity is to seek an equivalence that can be applied universally. 
Likewise, bourgeois society is ruled by such equivalence, of making ‘the dissimilar 
comparable by reducing it to abstract quantities.’115 Horkheimer and Adorno point out 
that ‘to the Enlightenment, that which does not reduce to numbers, and ultimately the 
one, becomes illusion.’116 In the context of a global society in which capitalism has 
become the universal, that which does not reduce to this medium, or serve as an 
instrument for the international economy, is dismissed as illusion and subsequently 
devalued.117 The intrinsic connection between modernity and the bourgeoisie is 
demonstrated in the way Cartesian and Newtonian philosophy has premeditated 
bourgeois thought, which Sarup describes as stressing the idea ‘of the conscious subject 
who calculates means and ends,’ in which ‘the subject is rational, autonomous and 
capable of initiating action.’118 
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Capitalism is a metalanguage in the most literal sense; it transcends national 
boundaries, cultural relativities, and even physical form, existing merely as semiotic 
interactions taking place in virtual worlds. Advances in technology have meant that 
capital mobility has conquered time and space, with the ability to be inserted or 
withdrawn almost anywhere at astonishing speed.119 At its optimistic best, capital can 
be understood to represent labor exchange—proof of productivity, work or 
contribution. However, it can also represent inheritance, theft, or luck at the roulette 
table. Capital does not discriminate. As a symbol, it signifies success, progress, and the 
sovereignty of the self, regardless of the source. Reduced to a singular symbolic system, 
the success of the worker or the artist is now comparable to that of the gambler, 
bureaucrat or thief. The value of work is no longer demonstrated in the work itself, but 
in the symbol of capital, which has become the only method of quantifying success.  
Science Subordinated 
The only discourse that comes remotely close to capitalism as an objective force is 
science. Viewed as the greatest intellectual achievement and ultimate reference point 
of modernity, science is generally seen as having access to truth in ways that would 
privilege it over other modes of language.120 However, rather than the pursuit of truth, 
science has become concerned with the pursuit of power.  
According to Gare, ‘scientific experts and … knowledge … are available to anyone 
with enough money.’121 This echoes Lyotard’s argument of ‘no money, no proof,’ in 
which ‘the wealthiest has the best chance of being right.’122 For Lyotard, an ‘equation 
between wealth, efficiency, and truth,’ has been established, leading the goal of science 
to be ‘performativity … [in which] the only credible goal is power.’123 In this sense, 
science has become no more than ‘well-organized research for the development of 
technology’, with funding ‘allocated by states and corporations according to their 
potential to augment political and economic power.’124 As research funds are allocated 
in accordance with this ‘logic of power growth’, research that fails to augment such 
aims is subsequently ‘abandoned by the flow of capital.’125 As capitalism orients 
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research ‘first and foremost toward technological “applications”,’126 science finds itself 
as a capitalist enterprise in which ‘scientists, technicians, and instruments are 
purchased not to find truth, but to augment power.’127 The application of science then 
becomes aimed at delivering an economic return for investors, and further 
entrenching the dominance of the bourgeoisie through the development of new 
technologies. 
In the quest for objectivity, the reduction of truth to a tradable medium has 
occurred, with the relationship between capital, science, and truth being reduced to 
one of investment and commodity production. Science does not have privileged access 
to truth; capital does. As the universal it is quite literally the one truth, with everything 
else required to fall in line with this master discourse. Even in its most pure and 
idealistic form, science is held contemptuously below the superior discipline of 
economics. The total subordination of science to economics is evident in the success of 
private interests in derailing the discourse surrounding climate change. Even where 
climate science is accepted as credible, potential solutions to the problem are typically 
dealt with through cost-benefit analysis, where the preservation of the Earth’s 
ecosystem is generally perceived as too expensive, or simply ‘not worth saving’ in 
economic terms.128  From this, we can understand that scientists are held to be the 
ultimate arbiters of truth—to a degree. They are the arbiters of truth unless the science 
they produce conflicts with the ideology that legitimates them. The cutting edge of 
modernity can be bought, sold, and quantified, solely in terms of economic capital. 
The epistemological materialist approach to knowledge means that it can be treated as 
a material resource whose extraction relies solely on the correct capital investment. 
The Triumph of the International Bourgeoisie 
Democracy has similarly come to be used as a stepladder for the advances of 
capitalism and the advantage of the bourgeoisie. As seen with the French Revolution 
of 1789, the overthrow of monarchs has resulted in the seizure of power by the 
bourgeoisie, with the global spread of liberal democracies facilitating the rise of a new, 
international species of capitalist. This new breed seem to operate on the assumption 
of continual transcendence from constraints—of traditions, monarchs, nations, time 
and space—as harbingers of a new liquid capital mobility, bringing forth the 
saturation of this absolute into every facet of life. While Gare argues that it is ‘too 
simple to account the cultural transformations of the west as the result of strategy of a 
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class to establish cultural hegemony over society,’ he maintains that it is possible to 
understand how this class has asserted its dominance by looking at the unintended 
consequences of social and economic processes that have affected people’s ways of 
thinking.129 Rather than accusing the international bourgeoisie of a conspiracy, in 
which they have methodically seized power, we can regard it as conspiracy by 
accident, perhaps even by negligence. In recent decades, we can regard it as a 
conspiracy of acceptance, in which self-destructive modes of thought have been 
accepted, encouraged, and homogenously applied worldwide. The ways of thinking 
that have given rise to the dominance of the international bourgeoisie stem from the 
Moderate Enlightenment, and have come to fruition in the grand narrative of 
neoliberal economics as the discourse of modernity.  
The Grand Narrative: Neoliberalism 
With capital as the metalanguage, the grand narrative of progress has been completely 
subsumed by neoliberal economics. Built upon the classic liberal ideal of the self-
regulating market,130 neoliberalism has become ‘the defining economic paradigm of 
our time.’131 It has come to completely dominate how we operate as a global capitalist 
society over the last quarter century.  
The Mont Pelerin society first systematically developed neoliberal policies in 1947 
as ‘a small and exclusive group … gathered around the renowned Austrian political 
philosopher Friedrich von Hayek.’132 Neoliberals since have identified themselves in 
the tradition of classic liberals due to their fundamental commitment to concepts of 
personal freedom, and their belief that the hidden hand of the market is the best way 
of ‘mobilizing even the basest of human instincts such as gluttony, greed, and the 
desire for wealth and power.’133 As a system of thought, neoliberalism actively glorifies 
‘individual self-interest, economic efficiency, and unbridled competition,’134 and as a 
political philosophy, it promotes three key policies: deregulation of the economy, 
liberalization of trade, and privatization of publicly owned assets.135 Neoliberalism is 
therefore characterized as an economic practice that promotes individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms through strong private property rights, free markets and free 
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trade.136 Governments that subscribe to a neoliberal agenda see the role of the state as 
extremely limited, with state interventions in markets being kept to a bare minimum.137 
Instead, neoliberals place their faith in the free market to maintain order through its 
seemingly natural and self-regulating nature, with the market presumed to work as an 
appropriate guide and ethic for all human action.138  
Neoliberalism Naturalized 
A distinctive feature of neoliberal economics is the organic and ‘rational’ status it has 
attained. Harvey argues that neoliberal ideology has had such ‘pervasive effects’ on 
our ways of thought that it has ‘become incorporated into the common sense way 
many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world.’139 Neoliberal ideology claims 
to present not just an ideal for social and political organisation, but an immutable reality 
of human nature.140 Margaret Thatcher (U.K. Prime Minister 1979-1990) famously 
argued that there simply ‘is no alternative’ to neoliberal policies,141 and this argument 
has proven to be chillingly prophetic in decades since, with almost all modern states 
having embraced some version of neoliberal theory since the 1970’s.142 Otherwise 
known as ‘economic rationalism,’ neoliberalism implies there is something inherently 
logical about this set of ideas, inferring that anything contradicting neoliberal ideology 
would be irrational. Neoliberalism is therefore not just an ideology that sees capitalism 
as the only possible economic system, but one that sees capitalism as synonymous with 
rationality.143 Consequently, it views free market capitalism as the most pure and 
natural relationship that can be formed between humans, with natural law being 
dictated by that which is in accordance with the free market.  
Deus Ex Machina: Neoliberalism and the Law 
However, following on from its Moderate Enlightenment predecessors, the perfect 
neoliberal free market society has its own conservative paradox to contend with; the 
rule of law. Despite their insistence on unbridled freedom and the diminishing role of 
government, neoliberals place a strong emphasis on conservative values, such as tough 
law enforcement and a strong military.144 According to Harvey, the ideal neoliberal 
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state should ‘favor strong individual private property rights [and] the rule of law’, 
along with the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade.145 However, it 
is not necessarily the rule of democratic law that neoliberals appeal to. Rather, they 
are ‘profoundly suspicious of democracy,’146 and, bizarrely, ‘governance by majority 
rules is seen as a potential threat to individual rights.’147 Democracy is instead viewed 
as a luxury that can only be extended ‘under conditions of relative affluence coupled 
with a strong middle-class presence.’148 Rather than democracy, neoliberals prefer 
‘governance by experts and elites,’149 an ethos that echoes the French revolution, 
where privilege and positions in government were only extended to professional men 
of economic worth.  
The anti-democratic streak of neoliberalism is ingrained in its formation, with 
Hayek and his colleagues in the Mont Pelerin society ‘vowing to stem what they saw as 
the ‘rising tide of collectivism’.’150 This is a trait that can be traced to Smith’s mistrust 
of collectives such as trade unions, monopolies, governments, and so forth, as artificial 
distortions on the natural conditions of free trade. In their justification for this 
disposition, neoliberals argue that state decisions are inevitably ‘bound to be politically 
biased depending on the strength of the interest groups involved.’151 However, this 
seemingly ignores the primary role of a democratically elected government. An elected 
government should work on behalf of the largest and strongest interest group involved, 
namely the polity it represents. Neoliberals see individual freedom as paramount, as 
long as that freedom is not organized politically, expressed democratically or sought in 
the best interests of a community. Democracy is only tolerable if the population 
consists of an adequately endowed middle-class with capitalist tendencies and 
aspirations or, as McCheseny puts it: ‘Democracy is permissible as long as the control 
of business is off limits to popular deliberation or change, ie. so long as it isn’t 
democracy.’152 McChesney argues that in order to be effective, democracy requires 
that people feel connected to their fellow citizens through specifically non-market 
institutions.153 He sees neoliberalism as ‘the immediate and foremost enemy of genuine 
participatory democracy’ whose net result is ‘an atomized society of disengaged 
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individuals who feel demoralized and socially powerless.’154 Therefore, the neoliberal 
free market system develops an ‘important and necessary byproduct—a depoliticized 
citizenry marked by apathy and cynicism.’155 This atomization of society into 
individuals is evident in the neoliberal transformation of homo-economicus from a 
creature of exchange, to a creature of competition. 
Neoliberalism Embodied 
Whereas the classic liberal account of homo-economicus was primarily concerned with 
notions of mutual co-dependence through exchange, neoliberalism places a greater 
emphasis on competition, viewing homo-economicus as a creature  ‘whose tendency to 
compete must be fostered.’156 The transformation of homo-economicus has seen him 
evolve not only into a creature of competition but, more alarmingly, into one of 
corporation, with the worker now viewed in terms of ‘human capital.’157 For homo-
economicus, ‘any activity that increases the capacity to earn income … is an investment 
in human capital.’158 This embodiment of capitalism means that, as a political 
rationality, neoliberalism now finds itself ‘without an outside. It does not encounter 
any tension with a competing logic of worker or citizen … States, corporations, and 
individuals are all governed by the same logic … of interest and competition.’159 
Consequently, in a world where everything is a commodity, homo-economicus has 
become both a commodity and an entrepreneur—an entrepreneur of himself.160  
Neoliberalism: Product of Modernity 
Similar to Descartes’ conception of the natural world as a single system that can be 
described and explained by rational principles, neoliberals see the world as rationally 
organized around a priori market forces and, based on Newton’s model, the new 
science of economics has become the central discourse for defining our world.161 Just as 
in the seventeenth century Hobbes was developing his ideas to ‘not only oppose the 
ideas of the civic humanists, but to make them unthinkable,’162 so too have proponents 
of neoliberalism legitimated their philosophy ‘based on the stark absence of 
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possibilities.’163 Harvey posits that ‘we can … interpret neoliberalization either as a 
utopian project to realize a theoretical design for the reorganization of international 
capitalism or as a political project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation 
and to restore the power of economic elites.’164 However, it matters not whether 
neoliberalism is a utopian project or one that is geared towards inequitable capital 
accumulation; either way it is a process that conforms to the project of modernity and 
the worldview dominated by the Moderate Enlightenment philosophies of Descartes, 
Hobbes, Newton, Locke, and Smith. As an ideology based on competition, 
neoliberalism implies domination through the maximization of personal profit, where 
the accumulation of capital is the means and ends by which everything homo-economicus 
attempts can be judged.  
The Legacy of Domination 
According to Wainwright, ‘the historical coincidence of global capitalism with the 
transformation of our planet’s atmosphere is no accident.’ He maintains that 
‘capitalism is at the heart of the challenge of confronting climate change, and any 
serious attempt to address global climate change must contend with global 
capitalism.’165 However, he acknowledges that comprehending, let alone acting upon, 
human-driven climate change is not possible if humans cannot recognize the world as 
anything other than an enormous collection of resources.166 That capitalists cannot 
possibly see nature as anything other than something to exploit is the direct result of 
the imposition of a mechanical view on the world, inevitably leading to the ‘constant 
conversion of the planet into a means of production.’167 Harvey posits that if we are 
indeed ‘entering the danger zone’ of transforming the global environment, then the 
further embrace of neoliberal practices will ‘prove nothing short of deadly.’168 Whereas 
economic growth was supposed to lift people out of poverty and put them in a position 
where they would be free of the tyranny of nature,169 it has ironically achieved the 
complete opposite; bringing forth the likely demise of humanity through the collapse of 
an ecosystem that has been pushed beyond its capacity for economic growth. This is 
the legacy of mechanistic materialism and the Enlightenment quest for control. 
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The Legacy of Accumulation 
Following on from this, the idea that truth exists ontologically as a literal ‘thing’ to be 
discovered or acquired by man has also had disastrous consequences for the 
environment. It presupposes the possibility of only one absolute truth in any matter 
and, reduced as it has been to a singular language of capitalism, dictates that there can 
be no other way to conceive the world other than one rationally organized around free 
market capitalism. It also promotes a mindset of commodity fetishism and capital 
accumulation, the bulk of which is done on behalf of the international bourgeoisie. 
However, as Gare argues, what is conspicuously missing is any point to this 
accumulation at all, with the international bourgeoisie having nothing to gain other 
than power for the sake of power, control for the sake of control and consumption for 
the sake of consumption.170 However, it is not merely a matter of consumption for 
consumption’s sake, but consumption for the sake of capital. Rather than acting on 
behalf of themselves, the international bourgeoisie have become the agents of capital; 
with commodity production only one half of the process we call capitalism.171 The telos 
of capital is replication. Capital is deployed in order to produce commodities, which 
are then sold, with the original investment returned along with a profit, only to be 
reinvested again to facilitate further accumulation. As capital is driven by this ‘constant 
need to realize more value’, it has become a ‘growth oriented process of commodity 
production,’ creating the ‘incessant demand for growth and expansion we associate 
with capitalist economies.’172 Rather than accumulation for the sake of practical 
means, capital has become the talisman of modernity and the chief indicator of 
progress. This is the legacy of epistemological materialism, where the act of 
reproducing the symbols of capital has become the very raison d’être of the modern man.  
The Legacy of Individualism 
Meanwhile, the seemingly contradictory forms of individualism expressed by Hobbes 
and Smith have been synthesized by neoliberal economics. The base assumptions of 
competition between self-interested individuals and the inalienable right of private 
property have become the core tenets of neoliberal doctrine. According to Hobbes, a 
modern state requires ‘overwhelming force concentrated at the center, under the 
authority of a sovereign,’ with subjects being made to understand ‘that their personal 
activities take place under … the shadow of this overwhelming central force.’173 
Neoliberals have effectively deferred this role of central organizing power to the free 
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market, stripping individuals of any autonomy to operate outside its pervasive shadow. 
Individuals in neoliberal societies have been coerced into an unhealthy reliance on 
market values as the only means to gain reciprocal recognition. This is ensured 
through the presumption that ‘everything can in principle be treated as a commodity,’ 
and that property rights exist ‘over processes, things and social relations, [and] that a 
price can be put on them, and that they can be traded.’174 
Similarly to how Hobbes’ sovereign was seen to be ‘both the wielder of supreme 
power and the source and guarantor of Rights,’175 the market has come to be viewed as 
the appropriate guide for all human action.176 The reality that both Hobbes and the 
neoliberals provide is one in which human nature cannot be rationally explained as 
anything other than a perpetual war of all against all. Jacob notes that in his ‘obsession 
with greed and the self-interest of men,’ Hobbes can therefore be seen as ‘the first 
major interpreter of the market society … [and] emergent capitalism.’177 Hobbes’ 
Leviathan can thus be re-read one of two ways, but each with the same devastating 
effect; either as rule by transnational corporations or as subordination to the market 
itself. The appropriate metaphor for the twenty-first century Leviathan would see the 
market as innate rationality, with corporations (quite literally ‘bodies’) constituting the 
earthly Body Politique. While neoliberals claim to take their cues from classic liberalism, 
they seem to have more in common with a Hobbesian view of the modern state, in 
which the source of power and guarantor of rights in a neoliberal society is found in 
the autocratic rule of the market Leviathan.  
Wainwright argues that ‘within a capitalist economy, inequalities in wealth and 
power make it difficult to build coalitions around shared sacrifice,’ as ‘inequality 
entrenches the capacity of the wealthy—who benefit disproportionately from 
economic growth—to prevent the conversion of our carbon-intensive economy into a 
more sustainable alternative.’178 These inequalities are generated and reinforced by 
free market capitalism, making it impossible to adequately confront climate change. 
To do so would require transnational alliances and trans-class co-operation built 
around notions of shared sacrifice.179 These are concepts that are in direct 
contradiction with neoliberal economic policies and the logics of modernity. The 
nature of homo-economicus means that he cannot conceive of a shared goal, let alone an 
altruistic one. This is the legacy of individualism, where the atomization of individuals, 
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the primacy of the self and the transcendence from backwards notions of traditional 
collectivism would see any collaborative, organized action on climate change contrary 
to a core logic of modernity.  
Economysticism: The Legacy of the God Machine 
Designating themselves as the rational and proficient users of the metalanguage, 
neoliberal economists profess to have uncovered the method by which we can worship 
the market correctly. Given that the underlying nature of reality can be explained 
objectively through reference to mathematical laws of causation, and that material 
appetites are sufficient causal explanation for all human behavior, capital has become 
the modern impetus for any meaningful action in the world. In this sense, capital is the 
Cartesian soul, it is the Grand Architect, it is the all-powerful Leviathan and it is the 
invisible hidden hand that oversees all earthly phenomena. As the pursuit of capital 
has become that which drives us, investment is seen to actively construct our world; it 
organizes governments, arbitrates equality, and dispenses justice. As long as citizens 
and governments continue to worship correctly, as long as the appropriate tribute is 
offered, the Grand Architect of capital will continue to create the world. It is the 
closest thing to God in the mechanical world, and the deus ex machina of modernity—
complete with eschatology.  
Enlightenment as Self-Destruction 
Habermas stresses that the project of modernity is incomplete and that we should at 
least try to hold on to the intentions of the Enlightenment, rather than declare the 
entire project of modernity as a lost cause.180 However, the project of modernity 
cannot result in anything but environmental collapse. Modernity and capitalism (and 
subsequently neoliberalism) have become one and the same. Marx and Engels argue 
that ‘the bourgeoisie … draws all, even the most barbarian, nations into civilization’ 
by compelling ‘all nations … to adopt the bourgeois mode of production … to 
introduce what it calls civilization into their midst … [and] to become bourgeois 
themselves.’181 To modernize a nation is to modernize an economy, and to do so is to 
introduce neoliberal economic policies and a growth oriented capitalist mindset. 
However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that ‘society can no longer live under 
this bourgeoisie,’182 given the current ecological state of the world. Just as the existence 
of the bourgeoisie Marx and Engels wrote about was ‘no longer compatible with 
society … because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his 
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slavery’183 so too has the international bourgeoisie become equally incompatible with 
the Earth, which it has transformed into its slave. The international bourgeoisie finds 
itself incompetent—or worse, unwilling—to assure the Earth’s ongoing existence 
beyond short-term profit margins. Zealously propelled by their own sense of economic 
‘rationalism’, the international bourgeoisie have become incompatible with 
themselves, and the Enlightenment has proven to be, as Horkheimer and Adorno 
argue, ‘indefatigable self-destruction.’184  
Ideological Hegemony and Soft Power 
What is most concerning is that the international bourgeoisie have the ideological 
backing of those who have nothing to gain, yet everything to lose, from their ongoing 
conversion of the earth into a source of personal profit. Both Gramsci’s concept of 
ideological hegemony and Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic power are useful in 
demonstrating how this has occurred, while the extent to which capitalism has come to 
precede ecological reality can be understood through Baudrillard’s theory of the 
hyperreal and the precession of simulacra.  
Gramsci’s concept of ideological hegemony aims to describe how a ruling class is 
able to maintain its dominant position in society.185 Gramsci stresses that cultural and 
intellectual factors underlie this. His concept of ideological hegemony insists that ‘the 
rule of one class or group over the rest of society does not depend on material power 
alone,’ and that ‘the dominant class must establish its own moral, political and cultural 
values as conventional norms of practical behaviour.’186 In particular, it is this 
‘intellectual and moral leadership’ that constitutes hegemony.187 More than just ‘the 
ideological predominance of a particular group or class,’ it is ‘the predominance 
obtained by consent rather than force.’188 Hegemony needs to be understood precisely 
as that—quite literally pre-dominance—in that it informs the majority, common-sense 
view of the world while also serving as the pretence for domination by justifying and 
facilitating the means to do so without resistance. Because it receives ‘consent from 
below,’ hegemony is a superior form of control as opposed to traditional domination 
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through force.189 Under ideological hegemony, the proletariat ‘wear their chains 
willingly … condemned to perceive reality through the conceptual spectacles of the 
ruling class … [and] unable to recognize the nature or extent of their own servitude.’190  
This is a mode of control successfully deployed by neoliberalism, whose success 
relies not only on the material capabilities and assets of its economic evangelists, but 
on tactics of ‘soft power’ as opposed to ‘hard power’. Whereas ‘hard power refers to 
military and economic might,’ soft power refers to ‘the use of cultural and ideological 
appeals to effect … desired outcomes,’ relying on ‘attraction and seduction’ rather 
than crude force.191 While the threat of physical violence is virtually implicit in the 
imperial aspirations of neoliberalism, this capability is typically used as a foil for the 
spread of its ideological imperative—freedom. As a soft power, ideological hegemony 
‘performs functions that the military and police machinery could never carry out; it 
mystifies power relations … [inducing] the oppressed strata to accept or “consent to” 
their own daily exploitation and misery.’192 This consensual enslavement has 
succeeded in creating a society in which ‘everyone is now willing to mumble … that no 
society can function efficiently without the market.’193  
The Precession of Symbolic Power 
Ideological hegemony is reinforced by the active participation in and production of 
what Bourdieu terms ‘symbolic power’. Bourdieu defines symbolic power as ‘that 
invisible power which can be exercised only with the complicity of those who do not 
want to know that they are subject to it or even that they themselves exercise it.’194 It is 
a ‘power of constructing reality,’195 of ‘making people see and believe, of confirming 
and transforming the vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and thus 
the world itself.’196 Bourdieu argues that ‘different classes and class fractions are 
engaged in a symbolic struggle … aimed at imposing the definition of the social world 
that is best suited to their interests.’197 This symbolic struggle takes place ‘over the 
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hierarchy of the principles of hierarchization’ in which ‘dominant class fractions … 
aim to impose the legitimacy of their domination.’198 As the power of dominant class 
fractions ‘rests on economic capital,’199 neoliberals have been able to redefine reality 
through the symbolic power of economic capital, with all other forms of social capital 
having been absorbed into this totalizing medium. 
This process conforms to what Baudrillard terms ‘the precession of simulacra,’ in 
which symbols are now viewed as the primary reality. According to Baudrillard 
‘simulation is no longer … a referential being or a substance. It is the generation … of 
a real without origin or reality.’200  We have entered what he calls the ‘hyperreal,’ a 
situation in which signs and simulations have become more real than the reality they 
once reflected.201 Baudrillard argues that ‘the age of simulation … begins with a 
liquidation of all referentials’ into an ‘artificial resurrection’ through systems of signs 
that lend themselves to ‘all systems of equivalence, all binary oppositions and all 
combination algebra.’202 He sees simulation as starting ‘from the utopia of [the] 
principle of equivalence, from the radical negation of the sign as value,’ in which the sign has 
become a ‘reversion and death sentence for every referent.’203 According to 
Baudrillard, there are four ‘successive phases’ of the image: 
 
i. It is the reflection of a basic reality. 
ii. It masks and perverts a basic reality. 
iii. It masks the absence of a basic reality. 
iv. It bears no relation to any reality whatsoever, becoming its own pure 
simulacrum.204  
 
Symbols have become detached from reality in an increasingly complex web of 
signifiers. Having become completely self-referential, these symbols now shape and 
precede the world from which they came. Reflecting back at themselves, they perpetuate 
their own value based on the algebraic equations that conform to the rules of a 
particular game. For instance, in the realm of speculative stockbrokers the growth of 
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fictitious capital is achieved according to the rules of its own game, yet it bears such 
little connection to reality that it periodically collapses under the weight of its own 
fraud. However, despite being so removed from reality, these symbols still have very 
real consequences as they continue to undermine their ecological origins.  
The current ecological crisis demonstrates how the original referent of the earth 
has succumbed to the rule of capital. We are witnessing what could be termed no less 
than the precession of symbolic power. The ideological hegemony of neoliberalism has been 
most efficiently expressed through the symbolic power of economic capital, and this 
symbolic power has been reified to the point where it now precedes ecological reality. 
It has become its own pure simulacra without any reference to—or at least with 
complete disregard for—its original referent, the Earth, to which it lingers as a 
veritable death sentence.  
The Need for Alternative Hegemony 
Both ideological hegemony and symbolic power rely on active submission and large-
scale acceptance in order to function. As symbolic power is defined ‘through a given 
relation between those who exercise power and those who submit to it,’ it is a power 
that ‘can only be exercised if it is recognized.’205 Similarly, hegemony is ‘a psychological 
state involving some kind of acceptance … of the socio-political order … arising from 
some degree of conscious attachment to, or agreement with, certain core elements of 
society.’206 
Bourdieu maintains that ‘what creates the power of words and slogans … is the 
belief in the legitimacy of words and those who utter them,’ and that ‘words alone 
cannot create this belief.’207 The degree to which we find ourselves complicit in 
environmental destruction rests in our ongoing acknowledgement and recognition of 
symbolic power, and the fact that we attribute value to it. By doing so we reinforce the 
ideological hegemony of the international bourgeoisie.  
What Gramsci and Bourdieu’s theories both call for, then, is an active disbelief in 
the grand narratives that confer these top-down* impressions onto reality. However, 
equally important is the development of an alternative hegemony to not merely 
counter, but to replace the defective modes of thought that underlie the worldview that 
neoliberal economics propagates. Jameson sees the idea that the market is in human 
nature as ‘the most crucial terrain of ideological struggle in our time’ and ‘a 
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proposition that cannot be allowed to stand unchallenged.’208 That there is no 
alternative to neoliberal economics is an assumption that needs to be challenged, but 
to do so would be to challenge modernity itself. 
III: TOWARDS PROTO-HISTORICISM: POSTMODERNISM AND THE CRISIS OF 
NARRATIVES 
I shall not be in the least surprised if … in the midst of the future universal good 
sense, some gentlemen with an ignoble, or rather a derisive and reactionary air, 
springs up suddenly out of nowhere, puts his arms akimbo and says to all of us 
‘Come on gentlemen, why shouldn’t we get rid of all this calm reasonableness 
with one kick, just so as to send all these logarithms to the devil and be able to 
live our own lives at our own sweet will?’ That wouldn’t matter … but what is 
really mortifying is that he would certainly find followers.209 
The quest to rationally organize society around concepts of modernity—around 
notions of linear progress, materialism, and individualism—has meant that there is an 
inherent impossibility within modernity to form an adequate response to climate 
change. According to Gare, ‘the idea of humans as complex machines, society as a 
social contract between egoistic individuals, utilitarianism, [and] mainstream 
economic theory … are all aspects of … this project to order society rationally.’210 To 
confront climate change would require an irrationality that is contrary to all accepted 
forms of modernity. One such response has been postmodernism and its incredulity 
towards metanarratives. 
Structuralism, Poststructuralism and Deconstruction 
To properly understand postmodernism it is important to understand the traditions 
from which it has emerged. The transition from the modern to the postmodern can be 
traced through structuralism and post-structuralism.  
Associated primarily with Ferdinand De Saussure and Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
structuralism was essentially an extension of the mechanical sciences into the realm of 
linguistics. As the ‘systematic attempt to develop … a general science of signs,’211 
structuralism was based on the belief that ‘the world was intrinsically knowable,’ and 
that there was a ‘methodological key to unlock the various systems that made up the 
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world.’212 For structuralists like Saussure, language was seen as a system in which rules, 
regulations, and ‘internal grammar’ governed how language operated.213 While 
structuralism identified that there was a relative stability to language and a degree of 
predictability within linguistic communities, this approach failed to accommodate 
chance, creativity, or the unexpected within its methodology.214 
This predictability in language extends to the predictability of narratives—to all 
systems—and is consistent with the linear and fatalistic tradition of modernity. The 
perception of language as fixed and rigid is symptomatic of the modern worldview in 
which everything, including human interaction, is calculable and reducible to a 
symbolic equivalence. From the structuralist perspective, ‘one system (or narrative) 
[can come] to seem much like any other … almost as if one knew beforehand what 
one was going to find.’215  
Post-structuralists object to this ‘overall tidiness’ in which ‘there are no loose ends 
and everything falls neatly into place.’216 They argue that the structuralist methodology 
is defective in that it tends to determine results by conforming them to its own inherent 
assumptions.217 As a result, post-structuralists have sought to overcome these 
limitations by attacking and rejecting structuralist attempts to ‘reduce the world to an 
object of analysis,’218 and have done so primarily through deconstructionism, most 
notably associated with the work of Derrida. 
Directed against the system building side of structuralism, deconstruction ‘took 
issue with the idea that all phenomena were reducible to the operations of systems … 
[and the] implication that we could come to have total control over our 
environment.’219 According to Sim, ‘Derrida was concerned to demonstrate … the 
instability of language … and systems in general’ through his concept of ‘différance’—a 
French neologism meaning both ‘difference’ and ‘deferral’. This sought to 
demonstrate that in any linguistic situation some ‘slippage’ of meaning occurs.220 
Derrida argues that linguistic meaning is an unstable phenomenon and that at all 
times a sense of différance applied.221 In this sense, a final meaning is always deferred, 
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and therefore unattainable, with linguistic interpretation an ongoing play of differences 
and deferrals.  
Symbolic systems then are not enclosed with a predetermined meaning; language 
exists and meaning is gauged in a space of colliding contexts and various cultural 
processes that change over time. Harvey argues that this ‘intertextual weaving has a 
life of its own’ insofar as ‘what we write conveys meanings we do not or could not 
possibly intend, and our words cannot say what we mean.’222 
Gare argues that there is value in deconstruction, ‘in that it undermines what are 
often taken to be the absolute reference points of reality, exposing them as arbitrary 
signifiers … made to seem ‘natural’ by a power group … [who are] imposing a fixed 
structure and hierarchy on society.’223 From this we can see how deconstruction serves 
a purpose in confronting the naturalized assumptions, enforced hierarchies and 
ideological hegemony of neoliberalism, as well as the arbitrary nature of symbolic 
power, manifested as it has been in economic simulacra. While Harvey argues that 
deconstructionism is ‘less a philosophical position than a way of thinking about and 
‘reading’ texts,’224 its implications extend philosophically in terms of how we 
understand and quite literally ‘read’ and respond to our world. Poststructuralism is 
therefore not only a rejection of structuralism and its methods in relation to linguistics, 
but a rejection of the ideological assumptions that lie behind them.225 This effectively 
amounts to a rejection of modernity—a rejection that is expressed more broadly in 
postmodernism.  
Postmodernism: Incredulity, (in)Difference and Unreason 
Postmodernism represents ‘some kind of reaction to, or departure from, 
‘modernism’.’226 It is the ‘rejection of core tenets of modernism and the embracing of 
post-modernity,’227 and emerged as an attempt to break from the ‘mechanistic, 
objectivist and deterministic worldview of modern science.’228 Eagleton defines it as ‘a 
style of thought which is suspicious of classical notions of truth, reason, identity and 
objectivity, … idea[s] of universal progress or emancipation, of single frameworks, 
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grand narratives or ultimate grounds of explanation.’229 It is most notably associated 
with Lyotard, who identifies the postmodern condition as ‘the condition of knowledge 
in the most highly developed societies.’230 This is marked by an ‘incredulity toward 
metanarratives’ which Lyotard sees as ‘undoubtedly a product of progress in the 
sciences.’231  
Lyotard’s argument is that grand narratives and universal theories have now lost 
all credibility.232 Critical of these grand theories, Lyotard instead celebrates the little 
narrative, or petit récit.233 Lyotard argues that the petit récit ‘remains the quintessential 
form of imaginative invention,’234 and the most inventive way of creating and 
disseminating knowledge and breaking down the monopoly exercised by grand 
narratives.235 In their function, little narratives ‘do not pretend to have the answers to 
all of society’s problems,’ and are instead ‘put together on a tactical basis by small 
groups of individuals to achieve some particular objective.’236 In this sense, little 
narratives champion autonomous, grass roots organization as opposed to the large-
scale, overarching conformity imposed by grand narratives. Little narratives take on a 
provisional status, becoming ephemeral and lasting only as long as it takes to achieve 
their immediate objectives.237  
This incredulity towards metanarratives stems from the poststructuralist tendency 
to ‘celebrate diversity and reject efforts to see unity.’238 Postmodernism likewise 
‘stresses the relativity, instability and indeterminacy of meaning [and] abandons all 
attempts to grasp totalities … in favour of more modest, specific, local and fragmented 
analyses.’239 The preference for little narratives over metanarratives places the 
emphasis on diversity and heterogeneity240 as opposed to the universalism of 
modernity, which sought equivalence and homogeny. Through this pluralistic stance 
comes the postmodern idea that ‘all groups have a right to speak for themselves, in 
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their own voice, and to have that voice accepted as authentic and legitimate.’241 
Postmodernists have thus ‘encouraged those who have been marginalized … to 
express and assert themselves,’242 while debunking the modernist meta-theories that 
tended ‘to gloss over important disjunctions and details.’243  
Against these Enlightenment norms, postmodernism sees the world as ‘contingent, 
ungrounded, diverse, unstable and indeterminate,’244 with a ‘resistance to totality … to 
teleology … and to closure of any kind.’245 Bauman stresses that unlike modernists and 
structuralists ‘the postmodern mind does not expect … to find the all embracing, total 
and ultimate formula of life without ambiguity … and is deeply suspicious of any voice 
that promises otherwise.’246 Lyotard encapsulates this sentiment when he advocates for 
us to ‘wage a war on totality … [to] be witness to the unpresentable … [to] activate 
the differences and [to] save the honor of the name.’247  
As a ‘negative form of philosophy,’ postmodernism sets out to undermine other 
philosophical theories that claim to be in possession of ultimate truth, or the criteria by 
which they can determine what constitutes truth.248 In particular, it is ‘the tendency to 
identify European notions of rationality with universal truth’ that postmodernists 
question.249 Spencer notes that it is ‘a recurrent gesture’ of postmodernism to be 
critical of ‘western rationality, logocentricism, humanism [and] the legacy of the 
Enlightenment.’250 Lyotard’s position can be understood as ‘a rejection of the idea that 
there are foundations to our systems of thought … that lie beyond question,’ and an 
attack on the self-authorized truths that are skewed in the interests of those who 
construct them.251 Lyotard sees truth claims as arrived at by consensus, as ‘an 
agreement between men … obtained through dialogue.’252 As a ‘horizon which is 
never reached,’253 Lyotard sees consensus as ‘an outmoded and suspect value,’254 which 
serves as a component of a system ‘which manipulates it in order to maintain and 
241 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 48. 
242 Gare, ‘Post-modernism as the Decadence of the Social Democratic State’, p. 80. 
243 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, p. 113. 
244 Eagleton, p. vii. 
245 Sheehan, p. 21. 
246 Z. Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1994, p. 245. 
247 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition p. 82. 
248 Sim, p. 3. 
249 Gare, Postmodernism and the Environmental Crisis, p. 36. 
250 L. Spencer, ‘Postmodernism, Modernity, and the Tradition of Dissent’, in S. Sim (ed.), The Routledge 
Companion to Postmodernism, London, Routledge, 2001, p. 162. 
251 Sim, p. 9. 
252 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, p. 60. 
253 Ibid., p. 61. 
254 Ibid., p. 66. 
                                                          
 ANDREW KIRKPATRICK 59 
improve its performance.’255 Consequently, it only finds validity as an instrument that 
serves to achieve its real goal, which is the augmentation of power.256 This reaching of 
consensus is something that echoes the classic liberal methodology of striking rational 
contracts between men, with what is deemed rational being determined by that which 
is in the best interests of the parties involved. This leads to confirmation biases for 
those who are actively reaching consensus through a privileged discourse, which has 
typically been from the standpoint of Western civilization. Postmodern theory can 
therefore be understood as the ‘deployment of philosophy to undermine the 
authoritarian imperatives in our culture,’257 with postmodernism amounting to what is 
essentially ‘a vote of no confidence in [the] entire tradition of enlightened 
philosophical, ethical and social thought.’258  
Easthope points out that ‘to respond that there are still grand narratives’ would be 
to misunderstand Lyotard’s analysis.259 He argues that at stake is ‘not just an awareness 
but the active trust and belief supposed by the concept of narrative knowledge.’260 
There is a case to be made for postmodern skepticism and disbelief, since active trust 
and belief is what provides neoliberalism with ideological hegemony and economic 
capital with symbolic power. In reference to the Velvet Revolution and the collapse of 
the USSR, Sim notes that ‘the populace simply stopped believing in the prevailing 
ideology, which then ceased to have any authority to enforce its will.’261 Such disbelief 
helped facilitate the collapse of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe; could it do the 
same for capitalism? Disbelief in the grand narrative of economic progress is an 
important first step to reimagining any alternative.  
The postmodern rejection of equivalence is also an important departure from 
modernity. Since globalised capitalism is built on a system of equivalence, of reducing 
everything to the medium of economic capital, we can see how diversity can be 
applied in order to develop new value systems based around autonomy and ecology. 
Meanwhile, the resistance to totality also defies the teleological narrative of progress 
towards a utopian singularity, which opens up awareness for a range of possible 
futures.  
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The Role of Narratives 
However, the postmodern incredulity toward grand narratives is problematic when 
responding to a global problem like climate change. Narratives are important because 
they orient us and they enable us to make sense of the world. Bruner identifies a 
narrative as an ‘account of events occurring over time’ that organizes our lived 
experience and memories into ‘stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing or not doing,’ 
and so on.262 All individual and social actions that take place are lived stories, and it is 
the narrative form that enables us to formulate goals and to act on these goals. It 
enables us to assess where we are at in terms of narrative emplotment and to 
understand ourselves in relation to this fixed reference point.  
Gare sees narratives as primordial ‘not only as a means to organize our experience 
and understand the world,’ but as the process by which human beings create 
themselves.263 Who we are, what we do, and why we do it, is only made intelligible 
through a narrative structure. MacIntyre argues that ‘It is because we all live out 
narratives in our lives and because we understand our own lives in terms of the 
narratives that we live out that the form of narrative is most appropriate for 
understanding the actions of others.’264  
As such, narratives not only inform the actions we take, but also how we come to 
understand ourselves in relation to each other and the world. According to Bruner, 
‘one of the principle ways in which we work “mentally” in common … is by the 
process of joint narrative accrual.’265 Sim identifies that ‘one of the problems we are 
left with when we dispense of grand narratives … is how to construct value judgements 
that others will accept as just and reasonable.’266 Gare maintains that this loss of any 
collective sense of narrative means that individuals ‘have lost the ability to construct[,] 
… reconstruct or even appreciate broader narratives about society and humanity.’267  
The Postmodern Acquiescence to the Market 
The loss of belief in grand narratives has ultimately led to a postmodern acquiescence 
to the market. Gare argues that postmodernists who debunk grand narratives have 
effectively capitulated to the global market and corporate power.268 He sees the rise of 
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postmodern culture as being ‘associated with the massive concentration of economic 
and political power,’ facilitating the triumph of neoliberalism.269  
While postmodernism may have arisen ‘from the amalgamation … of many 
deflections [and] diagonal gazes,’270 Harvey points out that ‘it is hard to stop the slide 
into … myopia, and self-referentiality in the face of the universalizing force of capital 
circulation.’271 The dismantling of grand narratives has meant that ‘the individual 
subject is no longer able to define itself reciprocally against a reliable, exterior 
object.’272 As a result, the role of ‘object’ has been assumed by economic capital, and 
this now serves as the lowest common denominator for reciprocal objectivity. 
Individuals then come to define themselves through the conspicuous consumption and 
accumulation of this object in order to compensate for their lack of a fixed, meaningful 
reference point.  
This process has seen diversity become equivalence, as ‘the common material 
languages of money and commodities provide[s] a universal basis … for linking 
everyone into an identical system of market valuation … through an objectively 
grounded system of social bonding.’273 While postmodernism ‘opens up a radical 
prospect by acknowledging the authenticity of other voices,’ it ‘immediately shuts off 
those other voices from access to a more universal source of power … thereby 
disempowering those voices … in a world of lopsided power relations.’274 In this 
capacity, postmodernism becomes ‘dangerous’ as it ‘avoids confronting … the 
circumstances of global power,’275 and offers ‘no defence against arbitrary … forms of 
doctrinal imposition.’276 For Harvey:  
the postmodern concerns for the signifier rather than the signified, the medium 
(money) rather than the message (social labour), the emphasis on fiction rather 
than function, on signs rather than things … suggest[s] a reinforcement rather 
than a transformation of the role of money.’277 
Postmodernism therefore has us ‘accepting the reifications and partitionings … 
while denying that [any] kind of meta-theory … can grasp the political-economic 
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processes … that are becoming ever more universalizing in their depth, intensity, 
reach and power.’278  
Environmentalism and Climate Science 
Another contradiction built into postmodernism concerns environmentalism and 
climate science. As a form of narrative knowledge, climate science presents a double-
edged sword for postmodern environmentalists. While scientific insights ‘have given 
environmentalism much of what public authority and credibility it has … some 
environmentalists see science’s rationalist and instrumental conception of nature as the 
fundamental problem.’279  
Aware that science and technology were the forces that made large-scale 
destruction of the ecosystem possible in the first place, postmodern environmentalists 
believe that the underlying problem is humanity’s ‘conviction of … [the] right to use, 
change, and exploit nature.’280 Also inherent in postmodern environmentalism is the 
‘suspicion that science might essentially be a tool of oppression at the service of the 
powerful,’ and this has contributed to a ‘gradual loss of trust’ in the sciences.281 This 
skepticism is not unfounded, with science having been used routinely in the past ‘to 
justify sexist and racist forms of domination.’282 For instance, it was not long ago that 
social Darwinism provided the scientific grounding for arbitrary racism, while the 
relatively new concept of the ‘selfish gene’ finds popularity today, despite the fact that 
when drawn to its logical conclusions it effectively vindicates rape. More importantly, 
the potential for science to wreak unparalleled destruction on the planet has a very real 
basis. There is a lingering perception that historically, ‘scientific insight and 
technological ingenuity went into the manufacture of ever more destructive weapons 
of war,’ ultimately leading ‘to a nuclear regime of “mutually assured destruction” 
[M.A.D].’283 With climate destabilization, we again find ourselves facing the most 
efficient and ingenious regime of M.A.D yet—the wholesale destruction of the 
biosphere.  
Awareness about environmental degradation would not exist in its current 
capacity without the insights of modern science, but modern science is seen as the 
method by which such degradation has been made possible. How then can 
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postmodernists adequately respond to climate change? The short answer is they 
cannot, unless they can reconcile this contradiction. One way toward this 
reconciliation would be to differentiate between the autonomous fields of research as 
opposed to those purely in the pursuit of performative outcomes. However, as 
discussed in Part II, this becomes increasingly difficult when capitalism dictates how 
science is conducted.  
The Triumphant Failure of Postmodernism 
Bauman argues that through postmodernism, the ability to act collectively and globally 
has been ‘all but discredited, dismantled or lost.’284 Postmodernism presents itself as a 
defeatist philosophy, asserting that ‘coherent representation and action are either 
repressive or illusionary,’ and that we should therefore ‘not even try to engage in a 
global project,’ or attempt to imagine some radically different future.285 
By discrediting the possibility of a grand narrative, postmodernism has taken away 
the ability for the oppressed to combine and be authors of their own destiny. 
Meanwhile, those already in privileged positions have been able to entrench 
themselves further, with their grand narrative not only unscathed by the postmodern 
critique, but actively reinforced by it. The result of this has seen the dominated strata 
fragmented and disempowered, while those who dominate ‘have never been more 
secure in their belief in the grand narrative of economic progress.’286 This dominant 
grand narrative is one that disproportionately benefits a select few, while condemning 
the majority to indentured wage-slavery and serfdom by proxy. In the process it 
continues to erode the ecological conditions for life on earth.  
Obsessed with language games and the arbitrary nature of signifiers, these have 
become the only reality for postmodernists. In the same way that Baudrillard notes the 
iconoclasts ‘who are often accused of despising and denying images,’ were ‘in fact the 
ones who accorded them their actual worth,’287 postmodernists have come to venerate 
symbols by mode of their deconstruction. Through its celebration of diversity, 
postmodernism has effectively leveled any sense of difference. By dismantling 
hierarchies and putting every discourse on par with one another, it has merely 
achieved equivalence by a different method. Through its incredulity towards 
metanarratives postmodernism has capitulated to the rule of capital as the only 
reliable, exterior, and binding object.  
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Authenticating a Grand Narrative 
Above all else, postmodernism represents a crisis of narratives. This crisis renders it 
impotent to tackle climate change on two interrelated fronts; first in combating the 
grand narrative of neoliberalism, and secondly in coming together to act on climate 
change. The crisis of narratives is not that they no longer exist, but that there has been 
a schism between the two primary forms of narrative: the petit and the grand. On the 
one hand, there exists the grand narrative of economic progress that almost everyone 
subscribes to. On the other hand, there are the little narratives that serve as isolated 
refuges from this. That there is no continuity between the petit and the grand is 
something that needs to be addressed.  
Against the grand narrative of neoliberalism, little narratives should offer a space 
for autonomous modes of resistance. However the challenge is to unify these little 
narratives into a cohesive and authentic grand narrative that can adequately challenge 
neoliberal economics. This can only be done from the ground up, through an 
intertextual weaving that binds the petit with the grand and provides a generative 
foundation for an overarching narrative that is dialectically constructed—and 
deconstructed—from below.  
What is at stake with both modernity and postmodernity is losing sight of the 
interconnectedness between both forms of narrative. Without a grand narrative, little 
narratives lack context. Without little narratives, grand narratives lack authenticity. 
Gare argues that it is through the ‘inherent reflexivity of the narrative form,’ that 
individuals are able ‘to question the narratives they have been encultured by and 
socialized into.’288 This enables them to ‘consider alternative versions of these 
narratives … [and] to construct their lives as unfinished stories.’289 Gare regards such 
people as ‘authentic’ and as ‘authors of their own becoming.’290 This is the process by 
which a grand narrative can be authenticated.  
A postmodern disbelief in grand narratives is not enough. Grand narratives should 
be engaged with dialectically, and either authenticated or debunked. However, it should be 
regarded as an ongoing process of authentication, of opening up a continuous dialogue 
between the petit and the grand; they cannot be separated. These narrative forms exist 
in dialectical tension, mutually informing one another. As Bruner argues, ‘even our 
individual autobiographies … depend on being placed within a continuity provided by 
a constructed and shared social history in which we locate our Selves and our 
individual communities.’291 It is in this sense that we become products of the history we 
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inherit and can view ourselves as the ‘bearers of tradition.’292 As bearers of tradition, 
we have a responsibility to contribute to tradition and to play a role in re-authoring 
and re-creating that tradition. As emergent human phenomena, narratives are created 
and exist dialectically; not as stale, abiotic things that can be adopted or discarded. 
Narratives need to be viewed as living organisms that require continual engagement in 
order to be sustained. 
What is required is a revival of narrative that does justice to the particulars without 
sacrificing the bigger picture. An authentic grand narrative would be one whose 
foundations are not abstract in the extreme, but connected to the earth and spiraling 
upwards. As a network of narratives of narratives, such a grand narrative would be 
analogous with a rainforest’s canopy: multi-tiered and constructed through the 
culmination of many individual entities that simultaneously provide and derive life to 
and from one another.  
 The Postmodern Respect for Truth 
MacIntyre argues that as a story-telling creature, man is ‘a teller of stories that aspire 
to truth.’293 It is this aspiration to truth that needs to be recognized as important; 
narratives do not encode truth, they aim to represent it. This awareness that narratives 
will never be complete should be an empowering facet of postmodernism.  
One of the criticisms often leveled against postmodernism is that it is a negative 
form of philosophy ‘more concerned with destabilizing other theories and their 
pretensions to truth than setting up a positive theory of its own.’294 As a negative form 
of philosophy, postmodernism is not concerned with making truth claims, but with 
identifying the falsified nature of all truth claims. As MacIntyre points out, ‘in La 
Nausée, Sartre makes Antoine Roquentin argue … that to present human life in any 
form of a narrative is always to falsify it. There are not and cannot be any true 
stories.’295 Uttering a ‘true’ narrative would require such absolute detail, presented in 
the most unambiguous of terms and with such unparalleled complexity, that to do so 
would be almost certainly impossible. To falsify is the very nature of abstraction and 
there is always bound to be, as Derrida argues, some slippage of meaning occurring.  
There is an inherent vagueness to reality that abstraction cannot capture. Perhaps it 
is a vagueness that abstraction shouldn’t attempt to capture, lest it make a disrespectful 
forgery and diminish that which it sought to reflect. It brings to mind Borges’ fable On 
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Exactitude in Science in which ‘an emperor wishes to have a perfectly accurate map of the 
empire made,’ only for the project to lead the actual empire to ruin as ‘the entire 
population devotes all its energy to cartography.’296 That’s not to say there is not an 
objective reality, but that attempting to map it exactly in abstract terms (and taking 
those abstract terms to be absolutes) can lead to decay. For instance, that we’ve 
mapped the entire world through an economic formula has led to its ruin. As we 
devote all our energies to accruing the universal simulacra of economic capital, the 
real world is being destroyed. Given the ecological ramifications of such equivalence, 
the question surely becomes one of diversity or death; do we come to terms with 
ambiguity and diversify concepts of truth, or do we strive to keep it sequestered and 
embodied in the economic symbolic realm?  
The modern paradigm of equivalence and efficiency is one of dogmatism and 
hostility towards alternate possibilities. However, even possibilities that are wrong still 
provide value by contributing to a broader discourse. When dealing in abstractions, 
there are always bound to be some things omitted or misrepresented. However, it is 
important to make dialectical contributions despite this. In this sense, it is far better to 
be wrong and open about the fact, than wrong and absolutely committed to it.  
We should be aware that all we can aim for is representations of imperfect and 
provisional truths. In different times and in different places, what is considered to be 
absolute truth varies wildly and with reckless abandon. Postmodernism, properly 
understood, should be seen as a deep respect for truth; of not taking truth for granted 
or reducing it to the plaything of arrogant civilizations. To make absolute truth claims 
ad nauseam is to devalue truth. Perhaps it is no mistake that Lyotard advocates—
somewhat bizarrely—for justice to be upheld as a value at the end of his report on 
knowledge. Perhaps doing truth justice means avoiding the tendency to constantly 
speak on its behalf. As Nietzsche put it: ‘Convictions are more dangerous enemies of 
truth than lies.’297 This awareness that truth is always provisional is important, lest our 
convictions become intellectual prisons.  
The postmodern respect for truth and skepticism towards grand narratives should 
encapsulate this. By recognizing and embracing the falsified nature of language games, 
and by becoming literate in these language games—in science, economics, philosophy 
and so forth—we can engage in meaningful discourse and distinguish between the 
authentic forms of narrative knowledge as opposed to the inauthentic, superficial, and 
arbitrary modes of control. In this sense, we can play a legitimate role in the formation 
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of these language games and grand narratives, and we can inform them authentically 
through active participation as opposed to removed disinterest. While narratives are 
essentially metaphorical in nature, they have transformative qualities that actively 
shape our world. As ‘metaphors determine … what we can think,’ they also determine 
how we can act,298 and in this sense, ‘language does not simply reflect reality but helps 
constitute it.’299 While language games and narrative knowledge may be abstract, they 
have powerful qualities that are worth engaging with. 
The Problem with ‘Post-’ 
As the etymological descendent of ‘the modern’, ‘the postmodern’ has an instinctive 
monopoly on the ‘alternative’ status of any anti-modern response. However, to be 
‘post-’ modern merely conforms to the linear logic of modernity, and it is for this 
reason that postmodernism cannot represent a break from modernity. Epstein 
identifies that the problem with ‘post-’ is that it is ‘ambivalent and … self-defeating’ 
because it has an inherent reliance on the pre-existing concept, thus presenting an 
inability to effectively move past this conceptual mode.300  
Harvey maintains that postmodernism needs to be understood not so much as a 
break from modernity, but as a crisis within modernity itself. He argues that there ‘is 
much more continuity than difference’ between modernism and postmodernism,301 
and Epstein also points out that there is ‘nothing positively new’ in the concept of 
postmodernism, except for it being ‘after modernism.’302 Even Lyotard believes that 
the postmodern is ‘undoubtedly a part of the modern,’ viewing postmodernism not as 
modernism at its end, but in its nascent state.303 In his later works, Lyotard confesses 
that his use of ‘postmodern’ was a ‘slightly provocative way of placing … into the 
limelight the debate about knowledge,’ describing postmodernity not as ‘a new age, 
but the rewriting of some of the features claimed by modernity.’304 He argues that ‘a 
work can become modern only if it is first postmodern,’305 and that modernity is 
‘constitutionally and ceaselessly pregnant with its postmodernity.’306 The ‘postmodern’ 
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therefore becomes teleological as the modern catches up to the postmodern the moment 
that the cutting edge is amalgamated into the present. In this sense, ‘the postmodern is 
always implied in the modern because of the fact that modernity … comprises of an 
impulsion to exceed itself into a state other than itself.’307  
The Postmodern Condition: Diagnosis or Manifesto? 
The question that needs to be asked, then, is whether the postmodern condition is a 
diagnosis or a manifesto. Marked by ‘dissent and disillusionment in equal measure,’308 
postmodernism is an ambivalent response to modernity. Despite its redeeming 
features, the postmodern condition presents critical failures in addressing globalised 
capitalism, and by extension climate change. It recognizes that something is wrong 
with modernity, but is not capable of imagining any alternative.  
Reacting against modernity with the effectiveness of ‘an awkward and petulant 
teenager, wavering between anger and revolt on the one hand and sullen reproach 
and refusal on the other.’309 Postmodernism needs to be understood as the fractured 
outcome of a ruthless process of modernization—ephemeral, irrational and ultimately 
ineffective against the overwhelming tide of sustained, organized, technocratic 
rationalism. At best, it presents a peculiar annoyance for the system—at worst, the 
perfect consumers to fuel the machinery of capitalism. 
The indeterminacy of meaning, the broken chains of floating signifiers, the lack of 
cohesive narrative emplotment and the complete absence of the real, points towards 
what is often cited as a diagnosis of schizophrenia emerging in the wake of modernity. 
The ‘post’ in ‘postmodernism’ is, in this sense, analogous with the ‘post’ in ‘post-
traumatic stress disorder.’ The postmodern condition needs to be understood as 
precisely that—a condition. Rather than a manifesto longing for some yet-to-be-
realized future, we need to take Lyotard’s Postmodern Condition as a diagnosis of an 
ongoing crisis within modernity.  
While some postmodern theorists ‘claim that we are in a radically new historical 
epoch … determined by signs, images and simulation models,’310 and that this is the 
postmodern era, we need to understand ourselves as squarely rooted in late-modernity; 
tethered to modernity, yet rapidly accelerating towards a post-modernity potentially 
devoid of all meaningful human life. If the project of modernity is the development of 
a metalanguage and the fulfillment of a grand narrative, then the post-modern era is 
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what must come after environmental collapse. Perhaps the simplest way to identify this 
crisis is as ‘late-capitalism,’ with capitalism having transcended and subsumed the 
modern as the de facto, positivist ideology. We need to understand late-capitalism as 
the epoch we are enduring and as the final, unfolding stages of a modernity that is 
rapidly approaching its denouement; one that we should hope not to reach.  
Proto-Historicism 
With the postmodern all but inseparable from the modern, what is required is a new, 
non-linear, sense of narrative emplotment. Arguing that ‘we live not so much after … 
as in the very beginning of a new epoch,’ Epstein believes that our current era should 
be more positively defined in terms of ‘proto-’ rather than ‘post-’.311 Rather than the 
prefix ‘post-’ which Epstein sees as an ‘arrogant and … parasitic addition to the 
existing cultural vocabulary,’ ‘proto-’ comes from the Greek protos, meaning ‘the first’, 
and indicates ‘the potential to become.’312 Despite its perceived ‘deterministic and 
teleological implications,’ Epstein argues that the use of ‘proto-’ indicates possibility 
rather than necessity, and is therefore able to avoid the ‘fatalistic outcomes’ of 
modernity.313 Unlike ‘post-’, ‘proto-’ possesses the ‘historical experience’ to locate itself 
‘not in the distant future, but in the distant past of the future it anticipates … not as an 
avant-garde, but as [an] arrière-garde.’314 
By ‘forecasting a future,’ Epstein maintains we are able to ‘position ourselves in its 
distant past.’315 It is in this sense that I propose the idea of ‘proto-historicism’. By 
seeking to become ‘proto-historical’, we could define ourselves as neither modern nor 
postmodern, but as having the potential to become history. ‘Proto-historicism’ can 
accommodate the desire for continuity between epochs, by locating the present as the 
fulcrum between past and future, and as the generative foundation for both. In this 
sense, the present is not just seen as creating the future, but also as engendering the 
past, which is equally important. Since ‘proto-’ gives us the ability to define something 
in advance, with foresight rather than hindsight,316 if we apply this notion to history, 
we can create a new dimension to how we view it. Instead of history being something 
that is merely described, we can play a role in dictating how it is actively prescribed—
literally written—by viewing ourselves as participants in its active creation. In this 
sense, history becomes a frontier much the same as the future does. 
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Indicating a ‘humble awareness of the fact that we live in the earliest stages of an 
unknown civilization,’317 proto-historicism should be viewed as the awareness that we 
are in the first stages of creating a new historical phase. Not merely as inheritors of the 
past, but as bearers of a yet to be created tradition. By viewing ourselves as ‘embryos 
of a future society … [and] looking back at ourselves from a distant future,’318 we can 
appreciate that time and narratives are not only about what comes next, but about 
what story we lay out behind us.  
From PoMo to Proto 
A switch from the postmodern to the proto-historical should not be difficult. In his 
later works, Lyotard argues that ‘rather than the postmodern, what would be properly 
opposed to modernity … would be the classical age,’ involving ‘a state of time … in 
which advent and passing, future and past, are treated as though … they embraced 
the totality of life in one and the same unity of meaning.’319 The desire for Lyotard, it 
seems, is to reconcile the past, present and future in a way that does not 
disproportionately privilege one or the other, but takes them all together as 
inseparable products and producers of one another. This can be achieved through a 
proto-historical perspective. 
By situating ourselves not at the end of history, but at its beginning, we can carry 
with us an optimism about the future and an optimism about a yet-to-be created past; 
as authors of a story still unfolding. Proto-historicism could provide this new sense of 
narrative emplotment, allowing us to ‘rewrite history’ not by dismissing what came 
before, but by re-conceiving when we consider history to be. It is with this in mind that 
we need to look towards the present as the past, and to decide what kind of history we 
want to create. Through this we can ensure a continuous narrative that can be 
reflected upon by future generations.  
CONCLUSION: QUIXOTIC MODERNITY: THE CHALLENGE FOR THE FUTURE 
 “Take care, sir,” cried Sancho. “Those over there are not giants but windmills, 
and those things that seem to be arms are their sails, which when they are 
whirled around by the wind turn the millstone.” “It is clear,” replied Don 
Quixote, “that you are not experienced in adventures. Those are giants, and if 
317 Ibid., p. 32. 
318 Ibid. 
319 Lyotard, The Inhuman, p. 25. 
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you are afraid, turn aside and pray whilst I enter into fierce and unequal battle 
with them.”320 
Modernity is an ascension, but to what end? The project of modernity sees us forever 
inching forwards and upwards, climbing towards utopia. However, in the process it 
seems we have found the sword of Damocles to not only hang closer, but to be much 
more terrifying than we had previously imagined. The end point of modernity relies 
on a total equivalence, an absolute, which is tantamount to nothingness—an 
equilibrium in which humanity reaches a plateau of inactivity. When the telos is 
reached, and we find the project of modernity exhausted, we may also find the flame 
of human civilization extinguished. Consciously or unconsciously, the project of 
modernity has provided the perfect conditions for environmental collapse. The 
Moderate Enlightenment philosophies, associated as they are with notions of 
domination, accumulation and individuality, have provided the underlying 
metaphysical assumptions we make about humanity, nature and our relationship with 
the world and each other. When placed within the overarching narrative of progress 
through the development of a universal metalanguage, these are the philosophies that 
drive Western Civilization and explain the logic that has provided neoliberal 
economics with its unrivaled hegemony in the twenty-first century. The universal 
aspirations of modernity have meant that the ascension of the domestic bourgeoisie, as 
experienced in eighteenth century France, has unfolded globally, with the twenty-first 
century dominated by private economic interests. This is the logic of modernity, and it 
is a logic that must be overcome in order to address the environmental challenges 
facing our global civilization. 
In Cervantes’ celebrated novel Don Quixote the idealistic and imaginative Don 
Quixote is contrasted with his realistic, simple-minded squire Sancho Panza. Don 
Quixote takes to jousting with windmills, believing them to be giants, while Sancho 
Panza tries in vain to alert his master that they are simply windmills. Don Quixote is 
taken to be completely mad, while Sancho Panza is celebrated as a bastion of 
rationality (albeit simple-minded, illiterate and unimaginative). To be quixotic is to be 
romantic, impractical, deluded and idealistic. 
Modernity could be characterized as a quixotic Sancho Panza: idealistically 
committed to the perfectly calculable, clocklike nature of windmills. Completely 
enthralled by a mechanical worldview and oblivious to the possibility that these reified 
giants of modernity—these titanic, mechanical Leviathans—could or should be slain. 
Perhaps what is lacking with modernity is this sense of imagination to step beyond the 
truths and convictions that immobilize our creativity. The idea that everything is laid 
320 M.D. Cervantes Saavedra, Don Quixote, trans. Starkie, W., New York, Signet Classics, 2001, p. 98. 
                                                          
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 72 
out rationally, and that we need only wait to discover it, does not leave much room for 
human creativity. And so the future appears closed to us, and we are seemingly 
consigned to our fate.  
What postmodernism has shown us is that it is not enough to simply be ‘anti’ 
modern. Deconstructive postmodernism is an important first step towards reorienting 
humanity, but it is not an end in itself. We cannot completely forget what came before, 
or how we got to where we are; what we can do is change how we proceed from this 
crisis. Without the possibility of finding cohesion in a grand narrative, postmodernism 
is not adequately equipped to confront modernity in a meaningful way. Until it does 
so, it will remain a mere subplot and symptom of modernity. It is in this regard that 
postmodernism has been a triumphant failure. It has been a superficial mode of 
resistance that is total in its prevalence, ineffective in its application, and illusory in its 
dissent.  
A postmodern response to climate change is not possible. It ignores the possibility 
of developing a grand narrative to collectively respond, while dismissing the narrative 
knowledge that gives climate science its legitimacy. Without an overarching grand 
narrative to provide a joint orientation for humanity, it becomes impossible for us to 
imagine, organize, and act collectively on a large-scale problem like climate change. 
To do so would require an inter-generational understanding of humanity that 
transcends our immediate selves. Such an understanding can only be formulated and 
cognitively processed through the form of a grand narrative, which inevitably takes on 
temporal dimensions. The intellectual challenge for humanity, then, is to become the 
authors of an authentic grand narrative that can wrest back control of our collective 
destiny.  
The postmodern condition can be observed in Cervantes’ character of Cardenio. 
Schizoid, disheveled, dejected, and out of faith with romantic idealism he is found 
wandering aimlessly in the wilderness of Sierra Morena. Having been spurned by 
promises of love and justice he is unable—or unwilling—to discuss his story. His 
fractured tale is one of deception and disappointment, in which his expected utopia—
being wed to his beloved Lucinda—is shattered. It is done so by the calculating and 
self-serving Don Fernando, who tricks Lucinda into marrying himself. Cardenio is 
unable to grasp and articulate his trauma, instead reverting to spasmodic bouts of 
indiscriminate violence. This of course goes no way towards recovering any sense of 
justice or correcting the ills done to him.  
Cardenio serves as an example of what can happen when a promised utopia is 
dishonestly and cruelly commandeered by the reckless impulses of a bourgeois 
modernity. Cardenio is eventually reconciled when he tells his story to Don Quixote. 
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It is through the narrative form that he is able to recollect the fragmented pieces of 
himself, place himself back in the world, and recapture the sense of reality that is 
required to take meaningful action. 
Like Cardenio, we too need to tell our story, but in a new way. Proto-historicism 
implies a future, but it does not demand one like (post)modernity does. The future is not 
inevitable. We are not owed a future—at least not a future that includes us. The 
choices we make in the present will dictate whatever future—and by implication, what 
past—we inherit, and whether we inherit one at all. We need to rethink our grand 
narrative in a way that presupposes the past, the present, and the future as interrelated 
and co-dependent on one another. Rather than an incessant demand for the modern, 
or even the post-modern, we need view ourselves as actively becoming the past—as 
proto-historical. To do so would be to ensure a future by defining the present in relation 
to its role as the active creation of history.  
As a new form of narrative emplotment, proto-historicism is just one aspect of a 
much broader challenge for the future. This challenge includes engendering an 
alternative and ecologically coherent metaphysics based on process, dynamism, and 
change. It requires a more adequate, non-reductive scientific and epistemological 
framework to combat the mechanistic materialist view of nature, and it requires a new 
ecological subjectivity to rival homo-economicus. From this can flow a renewed sense of 
ethics and politics, and these are areas that I hope to explore and synthesize in future 
research. 
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